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China has witnessed the same degree of industrialization in three decades as Europe did in two centuries
(Summers, 2007). This economic transformation began in the early 1980’s with the establishment of township-
village enterprises (TVE’s) and accelerated with the entry of private firms in the 1990’s. Starting with almost
no private firms in 1990, there were 15 million registered private firms in 2014, accounting for over 90% of all
registered firms and 60% of aggregate industrial production. The surge in the number of private firms has
had major macroeconomic consequences. China is the largest exporter in the world today and, depending on
how the accounting is done, the world’s largest or second-largest economy (Wu, 2016).
While China’s growth has been impressive by any yardstick, what is perhaps most striking about this
growth is that it occurred without the preconditions that are generally believed to be necessary for economic
development; i.e. without effective legal systems or well functioning financial institutions (Allen et al., 2005).
The government compensated for some of these institutional limitations by providing infrastructure and
credit (Long and Zhang, 2011; Wu, 2016). However, it has been argued that informal mechanisms based on
reputation and trust must have been at work to allow millions of entrepreneurs, most of whom were born
in rural areas, to establish and grow their businesses (Peng, 2004; Allen et al., 2005; Song et al., 2011; Greif
and Tabellini, 2017; Zhang, 2017). Case studies of production clusters; e.g. Fleisher et al. (2010) and Nee
and Opper (2012) indicate that long-established relationships among relatives and neighbors (from the rural
origin) substitute for legally enforced contracts between firms. Our analysis, which utilizes comprehensive
data covering the universe of registered firms over many years, advances this line of research by identifying
and quantifying the role played by informal community networks in the growth of private enterprise in China.
China is divided into approximately 2,000 counties and 250 cities (which are further divided into ur-
ban districts). There is an emerging literature that describes the role played by hometown or birth county
networks in facilitating China’s unprecedented rural-urban labor migration; e.g. Honig (1996), Ma and Xi-
ang (1998), Zhao (2003). If the sending county is the domain around which migrant labor networks are
organized, one would expect that this will also be the domain of business networks supporting county-born
entrepreneurs. Our strategy to identify these networks exploits variation in social connectedness across coun-
ties. Entrepreneurs born in counties with greater social connectedness will have access to better performing
business networks, regardless of where they are located, which will have verifiable consequences for selection
into entrepreneurship, business choices, and firm outcomes. The important difference between our formula-
tion and the specifications of productivity growth in the endogenous growth or agglomeration literatures is
that sector or location specific spillovers are restricted to entrepreneurs originating from the same county.
The initial step in our analysis is to establish that (historical) population density is a good measure
of social connectedness in a county. The reason is that the frequency of social interactions in counties is
increasing in spatial proximity, which in turn is positively correlated with population density. More frequent
social interactions facilitate community based enforcement of norms of mutual help. This argument is based
on the assumption that social heterogeneity within counties does not increase (too steeply) with population
density. While this assumption may be plausible in rural counties, it is unlikely to be satisfied in cities that are
typically composed of newcomers from a multitude of diverse communities. Consistent with these hypotheses,
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we show using data from the China Family Panel Survey (CFPS) that the frequency of social interactions and
the level of trust in local residents are increasing significantly with population density in counties but not in
cities. The analysis, therefore, focuses on county-born entrepreneurs, whose firms constitute approximately
two thirds of all registered firms in China, while using city-born entrepreneurs as a placebo group.
Although 60% of the county-born entrepreneurs establish their firms outside their birth counties, they
maintain close social connections to their hometown. Business networks, and the norms of cooperation
that support these networks, will thus continue to be organized around the birth county. Based on the
argument above, networks drawn from higher population density counties with greater social connectedness
will sustain higher levels of mutual help and will thus be of higher quality. The second step in the analysis
is to develop a theoretical model that describes the relationship between network quality and the dynamics
of entry, concentration, and firm size. The model extends the single-sector analysis of network-based entry
in Munshi (2011) to multiple sectors, with endogenous capital investments, allowing us to derive additional
testable implications for the dynamics of sectoral and spatial concentration and firm size.
There are two sources of network-based spillovers in our model. The first is that informal cooperation,
which includes the (post-entry) sharing of knowhow, connections, and informal lending, raises the productivity
and profitability of entrepreneurs from a given origin; i.e. birth county, operating in a given destination (we
use the term ‘destination’ to refer to sector or location). This role for the network arises because help
or trustworthiness is difficult to verify formally and, thus, markets for help or trust-based exchange are
missing. The second source of network-based spillovers operates through a (pre-entry) referral process, which
increasingly channels entering firms from a given origin into a (slightly) initially favored destination. The
pre-entry and post-entry spillovers complement each other to generate dynamic increasing returns to network
size, measured by the stock of firms from the origin in a given destination, that is increasing in network
quality. This is the key source of variation in our model, which delivers the following predictions:
(a) Aggregating across destinations, entry from a given origin is increasing over time; i.e., across successive
cohorts, and increasing in social connectedness at each point in time (and more steeply over time).
(b) Sectoral and spatial concentration of incumbent stocks are increasing over time and increasing in social
connectedness at each point in time (and more steeply over time). This prediction applies to ‘early
stages’ of the dynamic process; i.e., before the share of the most popular destination gets close enough
to one.
(c) Averaging across destinations, the ability and the initial firm size of marginal entrants (also of average
entrants, under an additional parametric assumption) is falling over time, falling in social connectedness
at each point in time, and falling more steeply in social connectedness over time.
(d) Averaging across destinations, post-entry growth rates of firm size of any given cohort are rising over
time, and rising in social connectedness at each point in time.
The intuitive explanation for these predictions is the following. If the initial stock of firms from a given
origin is slightly larger in a particular destination, then the referral mechanism will increasingly channel
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subsequent entrants into that destination, raising concentration. Greater concentration generates greater
aggregate entry by channelling firms into a limited number of destinations where they can take better advan-
tage of the increasing (post-entry) returns generated by network size. The flow of entrants and concentration
thus evolve together, increasing more steeply over time when networks are of high quality; i.e, when they
are drawn from origins with greater social connectedness, to yield results (a) and (b). The qualifier to the
argument is that this dynamic process can only proceed as long as the share of the most popular destination
is not too large, leaving scope for it to increase even further.
There are two sources of heterogeneity in our model: origin social connectedness and individual ability.
Given the payoffs in different occupations, only those individuals with ability above a threshold level will
select into business. The selection of entrepreneurs becomes increasingly negative across successive cohorts,
as the network gets larger, with a steeper decline for more socially connected origins because their networks
are growing faster and are of higher quality (generating greater returns to size). A larger and higher quality
network has two conflicting effects on the initial size of the marginal entrant’s firm: the direct effect, for
a given level of ability, is to increase firm size by raising the firm’s TFP, but the negative selection works
in the opposite direction to lower the firm’s TFP. Result (c) indicates that the latter effect dominates;
the marginal entering firm from more socially connected origins will be unambiguously smaller, with this
negative relationship growing stronger over time as networks get larger. Under specific conditions on the
model parameters, this result is shown to hold for average firm size as well. This contrasts with result (d) on
the post-entry growth in firm size. This growth is driven by changes in network size over time and is the same
for all firms in a network, regardless of their ability or their cohort. Because networks from more socially
connected origins are growing faster, firms from those origins will start small (result (c)) but subsequently
grow faster (result (d)).
The model generates a rich set of cross-sectional and dynamic predictions for entry, concentration, and firm
size that can be taken to the data. To validate the model, we show that competing non-network explanations
may account for some of our results, but not all of them simultaneously. Consider, for instance, alternative
explanations for the entry results based on additional sources of (time-varying) heterogeneity at the origin. We
measure social connectedness by population density in the entrepreneur’s birth county. Population density
is correlated with population, education, and traditional occupation patterns in the county, which are, in
turn, associated with the stock of potential entrepreneurs, their skills (ability), and their wealth. Apart from
the fact that our empirical analysis will control for these additional county characteristics, this alternative
explanation would generate positive rather than negative selection of entrepreneurs on ability, and would not
be able to explain the results on concentration. An alternative source of origin heterogeneity is associated with
lower and falling payoffs in the traditional (non-business) occupation in higher population density counties.
We show that this can explain the entry and negative selection results, but not the results on concentration
or the post-entry growth in firm size.
The predictions of the model can also be contrasted with an alternative explanation based on destination-
based heterogeneity in which firms from higher population density origins have better and increasing access
to preferred destinations, defined by their locational characteristics, the support provided by local govern-
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ments, or destination-based spillovers. The latter channel is emphasized by the endogenous growth literature
(Romer, 1990, 1986; Segerstrom et al., 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones, 1995; Segerstrom, 1998) and
the agglomeration literature (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Au and Henderson, 2006a;
Combes et al., 2012). Under this alternative explanation, destination benefits or spillovers accrue uniformly
to all entrepreneurs locating in a given sector or location, irrespective of their origins. Hence, it cannot
explain an additional implication of our model, which is that prediction (a) concerning entry and prediction
(d) concerning firm-size growth are robust to the inclusion of destination-time period dummies; i.e. within
any given sector and location, in each time period, the rate of entry and the growth in the size of firms is
increasing in origin population density (due to underlying origin-based networks). The alternative model
can be augmented to allow for heterogeneity in ability across origin populations, generating variation in firm
entry and firm-size growth within destination-time periods without requiring networks to be active. However,
as discussed below, even models that allow for heterogeneity along multiple dimensions or for convergence a
la Ramsey (1927) or Solow (1956), cannot simultaneously explain results (c) and (d), once destination-time
period dummies and initial capital are included in the estimating equation.
The third step in the analysis is to test predictions (a)-(d). We implement these tests with unique
administrative data, covering the universe of registered firms in China, obtained from the State Administration
of Industry and Commerce (SAIC). The following information is available for each firm: establishment date,
4-digit sector, location, ownership-type, registered capital (initial and subsequent changes), and a list of
major shareholders and managers, with their citizenship ID. The county of birth can be extracted from the
citizenship ID, and the firm’s legal representative is designated as the “entrepreneur” in the analysis.1 The
analysis is restricted to private firms and covers the 1990-2009 period, starting with the first wave of private
entry and ending when the initial growth phase starts to weaken. As discussed, population density proxies
for social connectedness in counties but not in cities. The empirical analysis thus focuses on county-born
entrepreneurs using population density from the 1982 population census, prior to large-scale labor migration
in China, as a predetermined measure of social connectedness in their birth counties. We successfully test
predictions (a)-(c) of the model with the registration data. These results are robust to the inclusion of
destination-time period dummies; if anything, they become stronger.2
The SAIC registration database is less useful for testing prediction (d) concerning firm-size growth because
after registering, firms do not adjust their registered capital from year to year to match changes in their assets.
We thus turn to the SAIC inspection database, which includes annual asset information from 2004 onward,
and the 1995, 2004, and 2008 rounds of the industrial census, which also include asset information. We
estimate a positive and significant relationship between birth county population density and the average
annual growth of the entrepreneur’s firm with both datasets, and an increase in the growth rate over time
(from 1995-2004 to 2004-2008) as predicted by the model. The results on firm growth are robust to including
initial capital and destination-time period dummies in the estimating equation.
1The legal representative and the largest shareholder are born in the same county 90% of the time.
2When testing the model’s predictions for the marginal entrant’s ability, which is included in result (c), we measure ability
by education, adjusted for the education distribution in each entering entrepreneur’s birth cohort-birth county. It is standard
practice to proxy ability by education. Recent evidence (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017) indicates that education is also a good
measure of entrepreneurial ability.
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We supplement these results with a direct test of the mechanism underlying the network model. In
particular, we estimate the relationship between initial entry and subsequent entry by firms from a given
birth county in a particular sector-location. Consistent with the dynamic network multiplier effect, we find
that one additional entrant from the birth county in the initial 1990-1994 period results in seven additional
entrants over the 2000-2004 period and nine additional entrants over the 2005-2009 period. Moreover, the
effects are stronger for firms from higher population density counties. In contrast, conditional on the number
of initial entrants from the birth county, the total number of initial entrants in the sector-location (aggregating
across all origins) has no predictive power for the number of subsequent entrants. This striking result indicates
that the birth county is indeed the domain around which business networks are organized in China and that
these networks operate independently within destinations, in contrast with the assumption in agglomeration
models that spillovers benefit all firms at a destination.3 The absence of generalised agglomeration effects
may provide an alternative explanation for why Chinese cities appear to be too small (Au and Henderson,
2006a).4 It also suggests substantial gains from expanding the scope of inter-community spillovers, as shown
by recent experimental evidence (Cai and Szeidl, 2017).
Having tested and validated the network-based model, the fourth step in the analysis is to quantify the
impact of these networks on firm entry and capital stocks. We estimate the structural parameters of the
model and then conduct a counter-factual experiment in which the networks are shut down. Although the
model is extremely parsimonious, it does a good job of matching entry and initial capital within sectors,
across the range of birth county population densities, within the sample period for the structural estimation
(1995-2004) and out of sample. This increases our confidence in the results of the counter-factual experiment,
which estimates that entry from county origins would have declined by as much as 64% over the 1995-2004
period (with a comparable decline in the total capital stock) had the networks not been active. As entry
and capital stocks from county origins accounted for approximately two-thirds of all entry and capital in
China, and there is no evidence of origin-based spillovers for entrepreneurs born in cities, this amounts to an
impact of approximately 40% for the entire country. Given the dynamic increasing returns that are generated
by the networks, the long-term consequences of their absence would have been even more substantial. We
also augment the structural model to incorporate sector-based spillovers that do not vary with entrepreneur
origins, along the lines of endogenous growth models. We find that after incorporating the role of origin-based
networks, these spillovers while statistically significant, are not quantitatively significant.
Given the large network externalities that we have estimated, a natural question to ask is whether the
Chinese government could have accelerated growth by providing firms with subsidized credit. To address this,
3We do not take a position about whether the network is organized around the birth county or around more spatially
localized clans within the county (as argued by Peng (2004) and Greif and Tabellini (2017)). This distinction cannot be directly
investigated, as the clan composition of the birth county population is not available in the Chinese population census, except at
the prefecture level which is too high a level of aggregation for our purposes. We can, however, infer clan affiliations of active
entrepreneurs from their surnames and birth counties. Estimating the relationship between initial entry and subsequent entry
at the level of the clan, we find that spillovers are concentrated within the clan, although they do extend to some extent to
non-clan members from the same birth county. This allows us to test a prediction of an extended model, where the network is
restricted to clans within counties, which is that clan concentration among entering entrepreneurs should be increasing over time
and increasing in birth county population density at each point in time.
4This has been explained by restrictions on migration due to China’s hukou system (Au and Henderson, 2006b; Desmet and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2013) and by competition between local governments, giving rise to multiple production clusters in the same
sector (Long and Zhang, 2012). Our explanation is that while firms from a given origin will concentrate spatially, there is no
tendency for firms from different origins to locate at the same place.
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we examine a second counter-factual policy experiment in which all entering firms in the 1995-2000 period
received a credit subsidy. The profit increase generated by the subsidy in the 1995-1999 period turns out to
not offset the cost to the government of providing the subsidy. However, the direct effect of the one-time
subsidy is dwarfed by the positive spillover effect on firm profits (generated by the additional firms induced to
enter in 1995-1999) in the subsequent 2000-2004 period, especially in higher population density birth counties.
If the government took account of these spillovers, which are not internalized by individual entrants, and its
objective was to maximize aggregate profit, then the optimal policy would be to target the subsidy to birth
counties with higher population densities; in particular, to those counties for which the subsidy has a net
positive effect. A third counter-factual policy experiment examines the impact of such a targeted subsidy,
which unambiguously increases profits relative to the un-targeted subsidy.
Our model is deliberately set up so that there are no mark-ups in output prices or wedges in factor prices,
in contrast with previous research on firm misallocation in developing countries; e.g. Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Our purpose was to demonstrate that small firms and wide dispersion in
firm size and productivity can be a consequence of community-based networks, that substitute for missing
markets and formal institutions, rather than inefficient taxes or regulations. Indeed, optimal second-best
policies, along the lines of the third policy experiment, that target subsidies to more connected communities,
would increase existing dispersion and induce even smaller firms to enter. An additional implication of our
network-based analysis is that policies aimed at raising growth and efficiency in economies where networks are
active should incorporate intra-community spillovers over and above individual ability. It should be borne in
mind, however, that such policies will have complex distributional consequences; in particular, policies that
target more connected communities are likely to exacerbate inter-community inequality, while promoting
intra-community equity.
2 Institutional Setting
2.1 Community Networks and Private Enterprise in China
The core administrative data set that we utilize for the empirical analysis comprises the universe of registered
firms in China, regardless of their size, from 1980 onwards. These firms are classified as township-village
enterprises (TVE’s), state owned enterprises (SOE’s), foreign owned firms, and private (domestically owned)
firms. Our interest is in the last category. New firms enter the database each year, while a fraction of
incumbents exit. We can thus trace the growth of the private sector in China from its inception in the
early 1990’s, which coincided with the phasing out of the TVE’s. As documented in Figure 1a, private firms
accounted for approximately 10% of all firms in the early 1990’s. Subsequently, they grew extremely rapidly
and by 2014 they accounted for over 90% of all firms.
While private firms may have increased substantially in numbers, what was their contribution to aggregate
capital invested? To answer this question, we examine the evolution of registered capital, by firm-type, over
time.5 Figure 1b reports the share of total registered capital, by firm-type, over the 1980-2014 period. As
5The initial registered capital represents the total amount paid up by the shareholders. This amount is deposited with the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) in China, and can be used to pay the firm’s operating expenses before
it becomes cash flow positive. Access to bank credit is also dependent on the firm’s registered capital, which is why firms will
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with their numbers, the share of registered capital held by private firms grows steeply from the early 1990’s
onwards and by 2014 they hold 60% of total registered capital in the Chinese economy.
The preceding descriptive analysis suggests that private firms played an important role in China’s rapid
growth over the past decades. But what forces allowed private firms to enter and, thereafter, to grow? It is
generally believed that governments at the local (county), provincial, and central level played a substantial role
in China’s economic transformation. Local governments provided the infrastructure to support production
clusters located throughout the country, which are a distinctive feature of the Chinese economy (Long and
Zhang, 2011). Provincial governments and the central government supported firms by giving them subsidized
credit and by aggressively promoting exports (Wu, 2016). Our research shifts focus from the government to
the role played by informal institutions in spurring private enterprise in China.
It is generally believed that informal mechanisms played a major role in China’s economic development.
Allen et al. (2005) argue that reputation and relationships must have substituted for missing financial insti-
tutions for China to grow so rapidly. Song et al. (2011) explain China’s unique growth path as consequence
of the fact that more productive private firms had to rely on self-financing in the absence of low cost formal
finance. Case studies of Chinese production clusters; e.g. Huang et al. (2008), Ruan and Zhang (2009), and
Fleisher et al. (2010) consistently find that the impetus for their formation came from within, with groups of
entrepreneurs setting up firms with little external support. The involvement of local governments is found to
come later, through the provision of infrastructure such as roads, markets, and quality control.
What specific institutional arrangements allowed these early entrants to come together and commence
production in an often initially rural location? There is an emerging literature on the role played by social
networks or guanxi in facilitating China’s historically unprecedented rural-urban labor migration over the past
decades; e.g. Zhao (2003), Zhang and Li (2003), Hu (2008). This literature describes how migrant networks
are organized around the rural hometown, complementing a well established body of work that takes the
often choose to increase their registered capital over time.
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position that ethnicity in China is defined by the native place; e.g. Honig (1992, 1996), Goodman (1995).
Migrants from the same rural origin move to the city in groups and most migrants end up living and working
with laoxiang or “native-place fellows” (Fang, 1997; Ma and Xiang, 1998; Zhang and Xie, 2013). In Chinese
cities, migrant-peasant enclaves are often named after a sending province, but as Ma and Xiang (1998)
note, this nomenclature is misleading because the enclave typically consists of peasants from a single county
or two neighboring counties. If the sending county is the domain around which migrant labor networks
are organized, then we expect that this will also be the natural domain around which business networks
supporting county-born entrepreneurs are organized.6
Counties in China are divided into villages, which consist, in turn, of one or more clans or lineages (Peng,
2004; Tsai, 2007). These clans historically supported the business activities of their members, who were bound
together by mutual moral obligations. It has been argued that this role has re-emerged in the post-collectivist
era (Peng, 2004; Zhang, 2017; Greif and Tabellini, 2017). We remain agnostic about the boundary of the
social unit from which business networks are drawn in this paper; i.e. whether it is the county or the clan.
As discussed below, the county characteristic that we use as the source of forcing variation in the empirical
analysis would apply to the county as a whole and to all clans within the county, and thus our results would
go through in either case.
2.2 Social Connectedness and Cooperation in Chinese Counties
We proxy social connectedness by population density. The basic idea is that the number of social interactions
that each individual has with local residents in each time period is increasing in their spatial proximity,
which, in turn, is increasing in population density. More frequent social interactions support higher levels of
economic cooperation. To make this argument more precise, consider a simple environment in which each
individual needs help from the community, defined by the population of the county or by his clan within the
county, for some task in each period. We focus on the case where each community is a homogenous social
group with symmetric interactions and payoffs. One individual is selected randomly from the community to
provide this help. The level of help is a real number e ≥ 0: this generates benefit V (e) to the recipient, where
V is an increasing and concave function of e, while the provider incurs a personal cost γe. In each period,
each individual is a recipient of help, as well as a provider of help to one other individual (on average). A
norm of effort, e, provided by each help-giver, if it could be sustained by some means, would thus generate
a per capita surplus of V (e)− γe. The (utilitarian) socially optimal level of help is e∗ = argmax[V (e)− γe],
while the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game entails zero help.
If markets for help were functioning smoothly, it could be purchased at a price of γ, and the optimal
allocation would result. In the absence of such markets, we can examine what levels of help can be sustained
in an incentive compatible manner by community norms based on social interactions. Any downward deviation
from a group norm of effort e that becomes known to other members of the community in a given period is
punished by social sanctions. This takes the form of a one-time penalty inflicted on the deviator at no cost
6A similar argument has been made in past research in India, where the endogamous caste or jati is the common domain
around which networks supporting rural-urban migration, business, and other functions are organized (Munshi and Rosenzweig,
2006, 2016; Munshi, 2011).
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to the punisher (e.g., a reprimand, or exclusion from a collective benefit or activity).7 While the recipient of
the help knows whether his randomly selected partner deviated from the effort norm and could impose the
sanction in response, community enforcement relies on third party sanctions — imposed in addition by others
in the community who come to learn about the deviation. The deviation could be observed by some others
in the community, who communicate it to those they meet, and the latter in turn communicate to others.
In this way news spreads within the community depending on the frequency of social interactions. Let this
frequency be denoted by σ, which we assume is rising in population density p. Consequently the expected
total sanction S(σ) imposed on the deviator is increasing in interaction frequency σ, and thus in density p.8
An effort level e can be supported in equilibrium if V (e)− γe ≥ V (e)− S(σ(p)). It follows that the maximal
supportable level of help is e(p) = S(σ(p))γ , which is increasing in p.
9
A community with a higher population density can thus support higher levels of trust and cooperation.
If the community is the county, then this implies that counties with higher population densities will be
associated with more frequent social interactions and greater economic cooperation. This argument can
be extended to the case where the county population is not homogenous, but, instead, is fragmented into
smaller social groups or clans, where cooperation is sustained only within clans, not across clans. Thus, while
individuals may interact freely with all residents of the local area, it is only interactions within the clan that
are relevant for social enforcement. Suppose that each county is partitioned into different clans j = 1, . . .,
where clan j has demographic weight ζj satisfying ζj ≥ 0,
∑
j ζj = 1. The clan composition of the county
is represented by the vector ζ ≡ {ζj}j . Assume that the frequency of relevant interactions σj in clan j is
an increasing function σ(ζj , p) of clan size ζj and population density p in the county. Then the level of help
ej exchanged within clan j equals e(σ(ζj , p)). If social composition ζ is independent of p, it follows that an
increase in p raises economic cooperation within every clan, and therefore the average level of cooperation in
the county. Under this assumption, social heterogeneity within counties does not affect our argument, as it
is orthogonal to p. In the absence of such an assumption, we would have to incorporate the indirect effect
of p on cooperation as it alters social heterogeneity; if the latter reduces average cooperation as is frequently
observed to be the case, then we would more generally need heterogeneity to not be increasing ‘too much’ in
population density.10
The assumption that social heterogeneity is not increasing in population density is unlikely to be plausible
for cities, which are characterized by substantially higher population density than counties: based on the 1982
population census, the population density in counties was 30 individuals per square km. on average, whereas
the corresponding average in cities was 140 individuals per square km. Cities are often ‘melting pots’ of
people from diverse social origins who have migrated in relatively recently, so their higher population density
7It is common to model sanctions in the form of a self-enforcing breakdown of cooperation in subsequent periods. We adopt
a simpler specification where the penalty takes the form of a one-shot self-enforcing sanction.
8This is a very simplified version of enforcement via informal community norms where higher frequency of social interactions
enables greater cooperation. For more detailed analyses of game theoretic models with this feature see Kandori (1992) and Ellison
(1994).
9The implicit assumption here is that equilibrium effort in the highest population density county, e(p), does not exceed the
socially optimal effort e∗.
10Peng (2004) and Zhang (2017) show that entrepreneurship and employment in private enterprise are positively associated
with measures of clan concentration within villages or prefectures, after controlling for local area characteristics. However, it is
not clear how clan concentration varies with population density.
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reflects greater diversity of origins rather than high intra-network density. The social enforcement that can be
supported within long-established clans or among local residents in counties (who have been living together
for generations) may therefore not be sustainable in urban neighborhoods.
Table 1a provides empirical support for our distinction between counties and cities. China is divided into
approximately 2,000 counties and 250 prefecture-level and province-level cities (which are further divided into
urban districts). The China Family Panel Survey (CFPS) covers a representative sample of households in
these counties and cities. The family module of the CFPS (2010) includes the frequency of social interactions
between the primary respondent and local residents; i.e. individuals living in the local area, which is the
village in the county and the neighborhood in the city. The social interactions are divided into entertainment,
visits, and chatting.11 Population density in the county and in the urban district (for city residents), is derived
from the 1982 population census and is measured as a Z-score. We see in Table 1a that the frequency of each
type of local interaction is increasing in population density (significantly for chatting) with county residents,
whereas the sign of this relationship is reversed for city residents.
Table 1b, which is based on the adult individual module of the CFPS (2010) looks at who the respondents
chat with most, distinguishing between local residents, relatives, and classmates (the three most popular
categories). In counties, higher population density is associated with a significantly increased likelihood that
the respondent reports chatting most with a local resident and a significantly reduced likelihood of chatting
with a relative. In cities, in contrast, higher population density is associated with a decline in the likelihood
that the respondent chats most with a local resident and with a relative, although these effects are not
significant at conventional levels.
Table 1a. Frequency of Local Social Interactions and Population Density
Dependent variable: number of interactions per month with local residents
Purpose: entertainment visits chat entertainment visits chat
Family’s location: county city
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population density 0.240 1.829 5.123*** -0.089 -0.474** -0.583
(0.340) (1.322) (1.837) (0.093) (0.217) (0.512)
Constant 1.284*** 3.543*** 17.849*** 0.972*** 3.442*** 14.057***
(0.201) (0.761) (0.965) (0.207) (0.417) (1.152)
Observations 8,572 8,572 8,572 3,359 3,359 3,359
Source: family module of China Family Panel Survey (2010).
Population density in the county or city (urban district) based on the 1982 population census.
Population density is measured in units of 10,000 people per square km, and then converted to Z-score.
Standard errors clustered at the county or urban district level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
The differences in social interactions that we have documented map into differences in trust, which is
closely associated with economic cooperation. The adult individual module of the CFPS (2012) collected
information on trust in local residents and in outsiders; i.e. individuals living outside the local area who the
11Entertainment includes playing mahjong or cards, reading newspapers, listening to radio,and watching TV. Visits means
going to the home of a local resident. Chatting is defined as a face-to-face interaction without any other activity.
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Table 1b. Interaction Partners and Population Density
Dependent variable: indicates whether the respondent chats with most with
Source of interaction: local resident relative classmate local resident relative classmate
Respondent’s location: county city
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population density 0.075** -0.088** -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 0.003
(0.031) (0.038) (0.016) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005)
Constant 0.229*** 0.511*** 0.142*** 0.125*** 0.606*** 0.161***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011)
Observations 20,070 20,070 20,070 7,357 7,357 7,357
Source: adult individual module of China Family Panel Survey (2010).
Dependent variables indicate whether the respondent chats most with a local resident, a relative, and a classmate, respectively, on a daily
basis. Excluded interaction partners include colleagues, social workers, babysitters, property managers, and teachers.
Population density in the county or city (urban district) based on the 1982 population census.
Population density is measured in units of 10,000 people per square km, and then converted to Z-score.
Standard errors clustered at the county or urban district level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
respondent meets for the first time. Trust is measured as an ordinal variable, taking values from 0 to 10.12
We see in Table 2, Column 1 that trust in local residents is increasing in population density for respondents
residing in counties. However, population density has no impact on trust in outsiders for those respondents
in Column 2, nor does it have an impact on trust in either local residents or outsiders for city residents, in
Columns 3-4. The results on social interactions and trust, taken together, indicate that population density
is positively associated with economic cooperation in Chinese counties.13 The discussion that follows shows
how the same social enforcement that sustains this economic cooperation could have been used to support
business networks organized around the birth county or the clan, regardless of where they are located.
2.3 Linking Birth Counties to Business Networks
Entrepreneurs in developing countries often rely on other entrepreneurs operating in the same destination
(sector and location) for different forms of help. Chinese production clusters, for example, are characterized
by a high degree of specialization by firms in specific stages of production, extensive exchange of intermediate
goods, and flexible adjustment to workloads and product specifications in response to volatile market demand.
Sustaining high productivity in this economic environment requires considerable mutual help. This is hard
to generate via market transactions, due to the inherent problem of verifying help sought and received,
coupled with a weak legal environment. Cooperation is based instead on community norms, backed by social
ties among the entrepreneurs in question (Nee and Opper, 2012). These social ties are based on the birth
county, even for entrepreneurs that have located elsewhere. Migrant entrepreneurs typically have close family
12The question on trust is designed to match the well known and frequently used question on trust in the World Values Survey
(WVS). The WVS measures trust as an ordinal variable that takes values from 1 to 4. The level of trust in the WVS is assessed
for the respondent’s family, in his neighborhood, among people that the respondent knows personally, among people he meets for
the first time, among people of another religion, and among people of another nationality. The CFPS measures trust in parents,
neighbors, Americans, strangers, cadres, and doctors. Our analysis focuses on trust in neighbors or local residents and strangers;
i.e. people the respondent meets for the first time (and who thus live outside the local area). These are the two categories that
overlap with the WVS.
13As observed in Appendix Table D.1, this result is robust to including additional county characteristics – population, education,
and the occupation distribution – in the estimating equation.
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Table 2. Trust and Population Density
Dependent variable: trust in local residents trust in outsiders trust in local residents trust in outsiders
Respondent’s location: county city
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population density 0.465*** -0.031 -0.047 -0.014
(0.160) (0.215) (0.036) (0.042)
Constant 6.619*** 2.177*** 6.328*** 2.214***
(0.083) (0.113) (0.091) (0.089)
Observations 19,389 19,389 6,496 6,496
Source: adult individual module of China Family Panel Survey (2012).
Trust is an ordinal variable, and takes value from 0 to 10.
Population density in the county or city (urban district) based on the 1982 population census.
Population density is measured in units of 10,000 people per square km, and then converted to Z-score.
Standard errors clustered at the county or urban district level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
members, such as aged parents, in the birth county, and visit it frequently. They (or close family members)
thus continue to interact socially in the birth county. It follows that cooperation at the destination can be
backed effectively by social sanctions imposed by the wider community in the origin.
To make this argument more precise, let the size of the network, which consists of entrepreneurs from
the same origin who have already entered a particular destination in period t be denoted by nt. The TFP of
an entrepreneur with individual ability ω at this destination equals f(ω)At where f is an increasing function
of ω and At = A0(1 + νh)
nt , with h denoting help provided by each member of the network to every other
member. As help provided by different network members is mutually complementary, there are increasing
returns with respect to the size of the network (for given per-member help). The ‘quality’ of the network is
reflected in help provided by each member, which, in turn, depends on socially connectedness in the origin,
for the following reason: The level of help provided in the business sector is mutually observable to network
members. Failure to adhere to a community help norm by any member is punished via social sanctions
back at the origin. The frequency of social interactions in the origin, and, hence, the population density p,
determines the maximal incentive compatible level of business help h(p) that can be sustained, where h(.) is
increasing in p.14 This implies that At = A0(1 + νh(p))
nt . Letting θ(p) denote log(1 + νh(p)), this reduces to
At = A0 exp(θ(p)nt) (1)
We will use this expression in the model that follows to derive the relationship between network quality, θ(p),
and the dynamics of firm entry, concentration in particular sectors and locations, and firm size.15
The important difference between our formulation and the standard specification of productivity growth
generated by agglomeration effects is that networks are based on the social origins of entrepreneurs rather
than the destinations they select: θ(p) reflects social connectedness in the birth county and nt is the number
14Let the cost of help for any member be γ′hnt(p), and expected sanctions imposed back in the origin for failing to provide help
be S′(p)nt(p). Then, following the argument above, the maximal help that can be supported by sanctions in the birth county
equals h(p) ≡ S′(p)
γ′ , which is increasing in p.
15The level of help, h(p), is determined entirely by social connectedness, p, in our model. An alternative model would allow
the level of help to also be increasing in ability. We will see below that ability declines over time as the size of the network,
nt, grows, which would result in an accompanying decline in the effective quality of the network. This extension would have no
impact on the results that follow as long as the decline in quality is not too steep.
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Table 3. Composition of Listed Individuals in the Firm, by Birth Place Population Density
Dependent variable: fraction of listed individuals from the legal rep-
resentative’s birth location
Birth location: county city
(1) (2)
Birth place population density 0.010*** -0.026***
(0.002) (0.002)
Mean fraction 0.741 0.608
Counter-factual fraction with random assignment 0.056 0.090
Observations 488,529 236,985
Source: State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) registration database.
Sample restricted to firm’s operating outside their legal representative’s birth county. Counter-factual fraction with random assignment
for such a firm is measured by the number of listed individuals from the legal representative’s birth county in its sector-location divided
by the total number of listed individuals (among all firms whose legal representatives were born outside their birth county) in that
sector-location.
“Listed individuals” includes major investors and top managers, but excludes the legal representative.
Population density in the county or city (urban district) based on the 1982 population census.
Population density is measured in the units of 10,000 people per square km, and then converted to Z-score.
Standard errors clustered at the birthplace level reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
of firms from that county operating in a given destination. In the standard agglomeration model, the θ
parameter would measure exogenous destination characteristics and nt would be the total number of firms
operating in that destination (irrespective of the social origin of their respective entrepreneurs). Ciccone
and Hall (1996), for instance, use the number of workers per square km at the destination as a proxy for
agglomeration effects. We will exploit this difference in the empirical analysis to distinguish between birth
county network effects and agglomeration effects.
We complete this section by providing evidence that firms remain linked to their birth county, regardless
of where they are located. While the model will assume, for analytical convenience, that each firm consists of
a single entrepreneur, in practice there are multiple key individuals (major shareholders and top managers)
in a registered firm. These individuals must exert effort and contribute in different ways to the firm, and the
moral hazard problem that applies to the provision of help between firms will also be relevant within the firm.
Using the same logic as above, cooperation within the firm will be backed by social sanctions in the origin.
More effective social sanctions will, in addition, be associated with greater representation by individuals from
the origin in the firm in equilibrium. The SAIC registration database, which we utilize for the core empirical
analysis in this paper, includes a list of key individuals; i.e. major shareholders and managers in each firm.
The citizenship ID is reported for each listed individual, from which the first six digits reveal the birth
county.16 The firm’s legal representative is treated as the key individual or “entrepreneur” in the analysis
that follows.17 Table 3, Column 1 reports the fraction of listed individuals in the firm who are born in the
16Citizenship ID’s were first issued in September 1985 and people born after that date are given an ID at birth. Those born
before that date were registered in the county or city where they resided at the time. Given the limited opportunities for labor
migration in that period and the cost of moving due to the hukou system, almost all rural-born individuals resided in their birth-
counties in 1985. The only exceptions were college students, college graduates, and soldiers, but these numbers were small. The
first six digits of the citizenship ID thus reveals the county of birth, with few exceptions, even for those born before September
1985.
17This individual is legally responsible for the firm’s liabilities. 75% of legal representatives are shareholders in their firms.
The legal representative and the largest shareholder belong to the same birth county in over 90% of firms.
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legal representative’s birth county, restricting attention to the 60% of firms that are located outside their
legal representative’s birthplace. On average, 74% of the listed individuals in those firms belong to the legal
representative’s birth county, as compared with the statistic that would be obtained by random assignment,
which is just 6%. Column 1 also reports the estimated relationship between the fraction of listed individuals
from the legal representative’s birth county and its population density. The coefficient on population density
is positive and significant, consistent with the hypothesis that firms remain tied to their origins, and that
greater social connectedness in the origin maps into greater representation by individuals from the origin
in the firm (even when it is located elsewhere). Table 3, Column 2 reports the same relationship for legal
representatives born in city-districts. We saw no evidence that population density in cities was positively
associated with local economic cooperation and, indeed, the coefficient on population density is negative and
significant in Column 2. Our analysis will thus focus on county-born entrepreneurs and their firms.
Figure 2 describes the growth in the total number of private firms and in the number of firms owned by
county-born entrepreneurs over the 1990-2014 period. County-born entrepreneurs make up about two-thirds
of all entrepreneurs in China and their firms are just slightly smaller than the average registered firm. The
contribution of these entrepreneurs, most of whom are first-generation businessmen, to Chinese economic
growth has thus been substantial. Our objective in the analysis that follows is to identify and quantify the
role played by birth county networks in supporting the explosive entry and subsequent growth of their firms.














1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
All entrepreneurs County-born entrepreneurs
Source: SAIC registration database.
3 A Model of Network Dynamics
3.1 Population and Technology
There are many counties of origin; each generates a network of entrepreneurs with an independent trajectory.
We assume the absence of any interactions across networks drawn from different origins, and will later
justify this assumption empirically. Hence, we focus on the dynamics of a single network originating in a
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given origin. Each origin has a given, exogenous, level of social connectedness represented by a real-valued
parameter p ≥ 0; this will determine the productivity spillover within networks of entrepreneurs who are
born there. The resulting variations in network dynamics with respect to the p parameter plays a key role in
our analysis.18
At every origin there are equal-sized cohorts of new agents born at dates t = 1, 2, ..., who live for ever
thereafter. Each agent is born with a random ability draw ω from an i.i.d. distribution. To obtain closed
form solutions, we assume that the distribution of logω is uniform on [0, 1]. Every cohort t agent makes a
once-for-and-all choice of occupation at t. Everyone has the option to enter a traditional, non-entrepreneurial
(T) sector; some agents will have an opportunity to enter either of two business sectors B1, B2. The different
sectors can also be re-interpreted as locations; hence the model applies either to sectoral or locational choices.
Denote total entry into sector Bi by past cohorts by ni,t−1.
Profits are increasing and concave in ability in the traditional sector: the profit of an agent with ability
ω in the T sector is ωσ, where σ ∈ (0, 1). It will turn out to be linear in ability in each business sector,
after incorporating the optimal capital size choice. So low ability agents would be better off staying in the
traditional sector, while high ability agents might want to switch to becoming entrepreneurs.
In sector Bi at date t, an entrepreneur with ability ω who selects capital size K has a production function
y = Aitω
1−αKα (2)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital elasticity, and Ait denotes ‘community’ TFP, which takes the form (as explained
in the previous section):19
Ait = A0 exp(θ(p)ni,t−1) (3)
Note that the TFP of each agent actually depends on his own ability draw, besides Ait. Hence ‘community
TFP’ Ait can be interpreted as the TFP of the lowest ability agent (with ω = 1) in the community: we shall
refer to it as CTFP from now onwards. CTFP is a dynamically evolving community level variable. It depends
on the size (ni,t−1) of the incumbent network, and on its quality θ(p) which is rising in p. The exponential
relationship implies that the rate of growth of CTFP over time is proportional to the (quality-weighted)
increase in network size. This represents the first source of network complementarity in the model, reflecting
gains from intra-network cooperation in improving productivity for those who have already entered sector i.
A second source of network complementarity that we introduce below will pertain to ‘referrals’ or ‘access’
to particular business sectors. The interaction between the two sources of network complementarity will
generate the increase in sectoral concentration, with respect to p and over time, that is an important feature
of our model.
All agents incur the same cost of capital r which is exogenous and fixed across all t, and all origins. We
are thus abstracting from possible network complementarities operating via internal capital markets, as in
Banerjee and Munshi (2004), which arise in response to financial market imperfections. To the extent that
18We could assume, instead, that multiple clans from the same birth county generate multiple networks. As long as p applies
to each clan, all the results that follow go through.
19The A0 term incorporates the product price and labor productivity. Labor is not included as a variable input in the production
function because it is not observed in our data. With the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function, the optimal
labor input can be derived as a function of the model’s parameters and is subsumed in the A0 term.
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larger and higher quality networks lower borrowing costs for their members, the resulting dynamics turn
out to be very similar to those generated via productivity spillovers, and would thus amplify the dynamics
generated by the latter alone.20 We also assume a fixed price of the product, which is unaffected by supply
from the network. This abstracts from price collusion among network members, as well as limits to market
size in a competitive context. These seem plausible in the Chinese setting, where most sectors are comprised
of a large number of origin county networks, and both domestic and international market opportunities are
large.21
3.2 Occupational Choice
To determine occupational choice, we first calculate the profits a new agent in any cohort with a given ability
ω expects to earn upon entering a given business sector, when the CTFP in that sector is expected to be
A. The latter is a sufficient statistic for the specific date, sector in question, and existing network size and
quality (which determine CTFP as per (3)). The optimal capital size K must maximize Aω1−αKα − rK,
and thus satisfies:




1− α log r (4)
(where φ ≡ α 11−α ). The resulting profit satisfies




1− α log r (5)
(where ψ ≡ φα−φ). If we allowed for credit networks organized around the origin county and parameterized
the interest rate as r = r0exp(−η(p)ni,t−1), then the productivity channel operating through the A term
and the credit network channel would not be separately identified. Although the model is set up so that
networks operate through the productivity channel, all the results that follow would go through if, instead,
they operated through the credit channel.
A fixed fraction k ∈ (0, 1) of agents in every cohort receive an opportunity to become an entrepreneur.
Each such agent receives an opportunity to enter one of the two business sectors. The fraction that get an
opportunity to enter Bi equals si,t−1, which is the share of incumbent entrepreneurs already in that sector.
This is the second source of network complementarity in our model, operating via aspirations, access to
information, or referrals provided by older members from the same origin in a given sector.
Of the new agents receiving an offer, the ones that will decide to enter are those who receive a higher
profit in that sector than in the traditional occupation. These agents will be endowed with a level of ability
that exceeds a threshold ω:







1− α log r] (6)
This threshold lies in the interior of the ability distribution if
(1− α) log 1
ψ
+ α log r − (1− σ)(1− α) < logA < (1− α) log 1
ψ
+ α log r (7)
20We ignore the role of labor networks in the model. The owner of the firm and the workers rarely belong to the same
community, even in network-based economies. The historical and contemporary experience, across the world, indicates that
incumbent workers (with a reputation to maintain within their firms) are the primary source of job referrals.
21Based on the registration data, firms from a given origin county account for 13% of firms at the destinations where they
locate, on average (within narrow two-digit sectors). This statistic is based on all entrepreneurs, including those who locate their
firms in their county of birth.
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We assume this holds at the beginning of the process for each sector, i.e., logA0 satisfies this inequality, and
we will restrict attention to ‘early phases of industrialization’ when it continues to be true (i.e., until T such
that logAiT also satisfies it). At later dates it may fail to be true if CFTP rises sufficiently; then all agents
will want to become entrepreneurs irrespective of their ability. Such later stages will be characterized by
some slowing down of the entry process, as the range of abilities that prefer to enter ceases to expand (having
reached the maximum limit). In the Chinese data we see some slowing down around 2009, partly as a result
of the worldwide financial crisis in 2007-2008. So the empirical analysis will be restricted to the first two
decades of private enterprise expansion, from 1990 to 2009.
Notice that agents receiving an entrepreneurial opportunity make their decision selfishly and myopically
in the model. The former assumption implies that they ignore the consequences of their entry decisions on
the profits of other agents. The latter states that they make their choice solely to maximize their date–t
profits, ignoring consequences at later dates. This enables us to compute the entry dynamics recursively,
simplifying the analysis considerably. If agents were more far-sighted, they would have to forecast current
and future levels of entry from the same origin county, generating strategic complementarity of entry decisions
within each cohort. This extension is considered in Appendix A, where entry decisions at t are based on the
discounted sum of profits at t and t+ 1, rather than t alone. We show there under some natural conditions
that a unique rational expectations equilibrium exists, whose comparative statics are similar to those in the
simpler myopic model. If anything, the myopic model generates a conservative bias in entry decisions. This
is because a network’s size cannot ever decrease over time and its quality does not change, and neither do
profits in the traditional sector. Those deciding to enter based on a myopic calculation would also want to
enter if farsighted, while some others deciding to stay out on myopic grounds may wish to enter when they
anticipate future network growth, which would further raise the returns to entrepreneurship.
3.3 Dynamics of Entry and Concentration
The two business sectors have identical ‘fundamentals’. At the beginning of the process (t = 0), there is a
small, exogenous number ni0 of older entrepreneurs (from cohorts preceding t = 1) who have already entered
Bi. These represent the initial conditions for the dynamics. These historical entry levels will generically not
be exactly balanced across the two sectors; without loss of generality suppose n10 > n20 so B1 has an initial
edge. This slight difference in initial conditions, together with the two sources of network complementarity
that we incorporate in our model, will be sufficient to increasingly channel entrants (particularly those from
high-p origins) into the dominant sector over time.
To derive entry in subsequent cohorts, we start with the threshold condition (6), which determines the
measure of agents from cohort t who would choose to enter sector Bi if they had the opportunity. Combining
this with the fraction ksi,t−1 of those agents that have an opportunity to enter (as well as expression (3)
for CFTP), we can derive the volume of entry eit in cohort t into Bi as a function of the state variables
ni,t−1, si,t−1:
eit = ksi,t−1[B + Cθ(p)ni,t−1]
where B ≡ 1 − 11−σ log 1ψ − α(1−σ)(1−α) log r + 1(1−σ)(1−α) logA0 and C ≡ 1(1−σ)(1−α) . This expression reduces
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further to
eit = Lsi,t−1 + κ(p)Nt−1s2i,t−1 (8)
where L denotes kB; κ(p) denotes Ckθ(p) which is rising in p, and Nt−1 ≡ n1,t−1 + n2,t−1 denotes the
aggregate number of business entrepreneurs from past cohorts from the same origin.22
Aggregating (8) across the two sectors i = 1, 2, we obtain an expression for the dynamics of aggregate
entry:
Nt −Nt−1 ≡ Et ≡ e1t + e2t = L+ κ(p)Nt−1Ht−1 (9)
where Ht−1 ≡ s21,t−1 +s22,t−1 denotes the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for sectoral concentration at t−1. This
index can be expressed as a function of the share of sector 1 alone, since Ht−1 = s21,t−1 + [1− s1,t−1]2. Note
that Ht−1 is increasing in s1,t−1 if s1,t−1 > 12 . We will show below that sector 1 will remain bigger for all t,
given that it is bigger at t = 0. We thus use Ht−1 and s1,t−1 interchangeably as measures of concentration in
the discussion below.





Ls1,t−1 + n1,t−1 + κ(p)Nt−1s21,t−1
]−1
= [1 + (
1
s1,t−1
− 1){L+Nt−1 + κ(p)Nt−1(1− s1,t−1)
L+Nt−1 + κ(p)Nt−1s1,t−1
}]−1 (10)
Equations (9, 10) characterize the evolution of the two dimensional state variable (Nt, s1t) representing
the aggregate incumbent stock of firms originating from a given county and their allocation between the two
sectors. The following Proposition uses these equations to derive the dynamics of entry and concentration
with respect to p.
Proposition 1 (a) Entry Et, the stock of entrepreneurs Nt, and concentration Ht are rising in t (for any
given p) and in p (at any given t).
(b) Et − Et−1 and Ht −Ht−1 are both rising in p, if κ(p) < 1 for all p and the share of the larger sector at
t− 1 is not too close to 1 (e.g., below 34).
The reasoning is as follows. The stock of entrepreneurs is obviously nondecreasing in t as entry flows are
non-negative. Next, observe that using (10) we can obtain the following expression for the change in the
share of sector 1 over time:
s1t − s1,t−1 = κ(p)Nt−1 (2s1,t−1 − 1)(1− s1,t−1)s1,t−1
(L+Nt−1)(2− s1,t−1) + κ(p)Nt−1(s21,t−1 + 1− s1,t−1)
(11)
A recursive argument implies that the share of sector 1 must rise over time (and therefore remain larger than
1
2 forever). Given s10 >
1
2 it follows that s11 > s10. Applying the same reasoning to each successive time
22Setting si,t−1 to one, equation (8) collapses to the entry equation in Munshi’s (2011) single-sector model of network dynamics.
In Munshi’s (2011) model, variation across communities is generated by differences in outside options – the σ parameter in our
model, which is embedded in L – rather than by differences in social connectedness, p. While both models generate an increase
in the flow of entrants over time, our model generates additional predictions for the dynamics of concentration and firm size.
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period, s1,t−1 > 12 for any t − 1, which implies that the share of sector 1 must be higher at t than at t − 1.
Hence sectoral concentration rises in t; equation (9) then implies that Et is rising in t.
Consider next how a higher p alters the dynamics, given initial conditions. We claim that it raises
aggregate entry Et (and hence Nt) as well as Ht at every date t. This follows from an inductive argument.
Observe first that it must be true for Et (and Nt) at t = 1, given the initial conditions N0, H0, upon applying
equation (9) at t = 1. Next observe that the right-hand-side of (10) is rising in p, given any Nt−1 and
s1,t−1 > 12 . Hence s11 must be rising in p, given the initial conditions. So the result holds at t = 1. Next
suppose it holds until some date t− 1, i.e., Nt−1 and Ht−1 are rising in p. Equation (9) then implies Et (and
Nt) is rising in p. Moreover, observe that the right-hand-side of (10) is rising in Nt−1 and in s1,t−1, given p
and s1,t−1 > 12 . The share s1t will then be increasing in p because it is increasing in s1,t−1, Nt−1 and κ(p)
respectively. Induction now ensures this will be true at every t. This establishes part (a) of Proposition 1.
Turn now to part (b). Taking first differences of (9)
Et+1 − Et = κ(p)[NtHt −Nt−1Ht−1] = κ(p)[EtHt +Nt−1(Ht −Ht−1)] (12)
Since κ,Et, Ht, Nt−1 are all rising in p, the result would hold for entry if it were also true for concentration
(i.e., Ht−Ht−1 is rising in p). A sufficient condition for this to hold is that it is true for s1t: i.e., if s1,t−s1,t−1
is rising in p (since Ht −Ht−1 = 2(s1t − s1,t−1)(s1t + s1,t−1 − 1), and we have already shown that s1t, s1,t−1
are rising in p). However, this sufficient condition cannot hold for large enough values of t, for the simple
reason that the share of the dominant sector B1 is bounded above by 1. If it rises at a fast rate initially, it
approaches 1 and then must ‘flatten out’. So after a sufficient amount of time has passed, a high p origin
could be almost entirely concentrated in sector B1, while the share of this sector is continuing to rise for
lower p origins.
Part (b) states that the result holds if the share of sector 1 is not too large, e.g., smaller than 34 , and κ(p) <
1. It is easily checked that κ(p) < 1 implies that the denominator of the right-hand-side of (11) is decreasing
in s1,t−1. And the numerator is increasing in s1,t−1 if s1,t−1 < 34 (since this implies s1,t−1(1 − s1,t−1) > 16).
Then s1t − s1,t−1 is rising in s1,t−1, as well as in Nt−1 and κ. Part (b) then follows from the fact that
s1,t−1, Nt−1 are rising in p.
3.4 Firm Size Dynamics
Next we turn to predictions concerning entrepreneurial ability and firm size. We first show that network
effects generate negative selection on ability: as community TFP grows with the incumbent stock over time,
the threshold for entry falls, and entrepreneurs with weaker talent start entering. This negative selection on
individual ability outweighs the productivity benefit derived from a larger network, implying that marginal
entrepreneurs that enter are of lower productivity and hence enter with smaller firm sizes. The same applies
to comparisons at any given t across different p origins: marginal entrants from higher p origins, with stronger
networks, enter with smaller firm sizes. If σ ∈ (12 , 1) this is true also for the average entrant: firms from
high p origins enter with smaller initial capital on average. All firms face the same cost of capital and there
are no mark-ups in our model. The preponderance of small and seemingly unproductive firms often noted in
developing countries, which is typically attributed to wedges in factor prices and mark-ups in output price in
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the misallocation literature, may just be a manifestation of strong network effects! Our model implies that
their own productivity understates their contribution via spillovers to their network.
In contrast, post-entry growth rates of firm size for any given cohort are shown to be rising in p and over
time. In our model, growth in firm size is independent of the entrepreneur’s ability and cohort. Changes in
size are driven entirely by changes in CTFP, and are the same for all firms in a network at a given point
in time. Because CTFP is increasing over time and increasing in p at each point in time, firm growth has
the same properties. Firms from high-p origins start smaller, but subsequently grow faster.23 This dual
prediction will be especially helpful in distinguishing our network-based model from alternative models, as
discussed in the next section.
Proposition 2 Assume that (b) of Proposition 1 holds. Averaging across sectors:
(a) Initial capital and ability of marginal entrants (also of average entrants if σ > 12) is decreasing in t (for
any given p) and in p (for any given t), and decreasing more steeply in p across successive cohorts.
(b) The growth rate of capital of incumbent entrepreneurs of any past cohort t from t′− 1(> t) to t′ is rising
in p and in t′ (more steeply with higher p).
To verify (a), observe that the ability threshold for entrants is decreasing in CTFP, A, from (6). With
regard to initial firm size, there are two conflicting effects of a higher CFTP: the direct effect, for a given level
of ability, would induce a higher firm size by raising firm level TFP, but this would be offset by the negative
selection on ability, which lowers firm TFP and size. In general, the latter effect dominates.24 Substituting
from (6) in (4), initial capital size of the marginal entrant satisfies
logKmit = U −
σ
(1− σ)(1− α) logAit (13)
where U ≡ log φ − 11−σ logψ − 11−α log r, and logAit denotes log CFTP at t. Initial capital of the marginal
entrant is unambiguously decreasing in CFTP.
Next consider the ability and size of the average (rather than marginal) entrant. Note that the average
entrant has (log) ability
1+logωit
2 , which is decreasing in CFTP. Substituting from (6) in (4), the capital size
of the average entrant satisfies:
logKait = W +
1− 2σ
2(1− α)(1− σ) logAit (14)
where W ≡ log φ + 12 + 12(1−σ) log 1ψ − 2−α−2σ2(1−α)(1−σ) log r. Expression (14) shows that higher CFTP is also
negatively correlated with firm size of the average entrant, if and only if σ > 12 . When this condition holds,
23In a related paper, Banerjee and Munshi (2004) find that outsiders in Tirupur’s garment cluster, who face a higher cost of
capital because they have weaker local credit networks, start with smaller firms and then grow faster (because they are positively
selected on ability). To explain Banerjee and Munshi’s findings, our model would need to be augmented to allow firm growth to
be increasing in the entrepreneur’s ability, with the additional condition that the ability effect needs to dominate the network
effect (which is stronger for the insiders).
24Given that the ability threshold declines, the marginal entrant must be worse off in the traditional sector (where profits are
increasing in ability). The marginal entrant is indifferent between the traditional occupation and business by definition and,
hence, profit in business must decline. Profit in business is determined by TFP and the capital investment, which are positively
correlated. Thus, if profit declines, then both TFP and capital must decline.
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the drop in the minimum ability threshold (when CFTP rises) is steep enough to outweigh the direct positive
effect of CFTP.
Part (a) of Proposition 2 follows directly from the preceding discussion, based on variation in CTFP, and
(13) and (14). CTFP (in logs) can be expressed as, log(Ait) ≡ logA0 + θ(p)ni,t−1. Averaging across sectors,
the ni,t−1 term in the preceding expression is replaced by Nt−1, which is rising in t (for any given p) and in
p (at any given t) from Proposition 1. Moreover, the change in Nt over time; i.e. Et−1, is also increasing in
p, to complete the argument.
Now turn to part (b). Observe that (4) implies that the capital at date t′ > t of a cohort t entrepreneur
with ability ω is given by
logKaitt′ = logω + log φ−
1
1− α log r +
1




implying a growth rate at period t′:
logKait,t′ − logKait,t′−1 =
1
1− αθ(p)eit′ (16)
Averaging across sectors, eit′ is replaced by Et′ in the equation above. Et′ is rising in p (for any given t
′) and
in t′ (for any given p, but more steeply with higher p) from Proposition 1, which establishes Proposition 2.
Notice that the growth rate in firm size is independent of the entrepreneur’s ability, ω, and his cohort, t.
3.5 Alternative Models
To what extent do the preceding results rely on network spillovers across birth county members? Could they
be obtained, instead, by relaxing different assumptions of our model, while shutting down the network com-
ponent? These questions are relevant because although population density is plausibly associated with social
connectedness and, hence, network quality, it could also be correlated with other factors that independently
determine the dynamics of entry, concentration, and firm size. The discussion that follows systematically
examines this possibility by introducing new sources of (possibly time-varying) heterogeneity at the origin,
which are, in turn, correlated with population density, and by allowing firms from different origins to have
favorable access to destinations of varying quality. Our model treats sectors and locations interchangeably.
Because locational heterogeneity is an important alternative that we must consider, entrepreneurs choose
between locations rather than sectors (which we refer to as destinations for expositional convenience) in the
models that follow.
3.5.1 Origin Heterogeneity
Our model assumes that the stock of potential entrepreneurs, k, is constant across origin counties and over
time. Suppose that we relax this assumption and let k(p, t) be a twice differentiable function satisfying
kp > 0, kt > 0, kpt > 0. This could be because higher population density counties simply have larger
populations that are growing relatively fast over time or because their residents have greater wealth or
preferred access to finance, which facilitate entry into business. An additional source of origin heterogeneity
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could be in payoffs in the traditional occupation across counties. Our model assumes that the payoff, ωσ,
where ω is individual ability, is the same in all counties and constant over time. However, the payoff could
be lower in higher population density counties because there is a larger population for a given amount of
resources (such as agricultural land). It is also possible that this population pressure is increasing over time.
We allow for this possibility by representing the payoff in the traditional sector by ωσv(p, t), where v(p, t) is
a twice differentiable function satisfying vp < 0, vt < 0, vpt < 0.
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Abstract for the time being from heterogeneity across destinations, so the TFP of any entrepreneur
with ability ω at any destination at time t is ω1−αAt, with At growing exogenously over time. Moreover,
an exogenous share si of potential entrepreneurs at each origin have the opportunity to enter any given
destination. Owing to the absence of network effects, neither At nor si depend on p.











1− α log r −
1
1− α logAt + log v(p, t)
]
(17)
while the expression for entry flows is:
ei(p, t) = sik(p, t)
[
1 + Z +
1
(1− α)(1− σ) logAt −
1
1− σ log v(p, t)
]
(18)
where Z ≡ 11−σ logψ + α(1−α)(1−σ) log r. The entry flows will be rising in p and in t, and the slope with
respect to p will be rising in t. The alternative model can thus generate our model’s predictions for entry.
However, the share of different destinations will be constant and independent of p. In order to obtain the same
predictions for spatial concentration generated by the network model, the shares si of different destinations
would have to (exogenously) depend on p and t in a way that exactly delivers these results. Although we
do not explicitly incorporate sectors in the alternative model, it would similarly need to be augmented to
exactly match our model’s predictions for the dynamics of sectoral concentration.
With σ ∈ (12 , 1) the initial capital of entrants would fall over time due to the increase in At and the decline
in v(p, t), and would also be falling in p (more steeply over time) due to the v(p, t) term. However, post-entry
growth of firm size would be driven entirely by rising productivity at the destinations, At, which does not
vary with the origins of entrepreneurs. Hence this model would not generate result (b) of Proposition 2
concerning post-entry growth in firm size across origin counties.
3.5.2 Destination Heterogeneity
Now consider the implications of varying productivity levels and growth rates across destinations. This could
reflect the effect of geography, support provided by local governments (through credit and infrastructure), or
agglomeration spillovers. The latter depend on the total number of firms at a destination, regardless of their
origin. Let Ait denote productivity at destination i at t, which does not vary with the origins of entrepreneurs
in the absence of network effects. Suppose in addition that high p origins have better, and increasing, access
to the faster growing destinations. For instance, if there are two destinations and productivity at destination
25An alternative interpretation of v(p, t) is that it represents the payoff from origin-based networks operating in the traditional
sector.
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1 is higher and growing faster than at destination 2, then the share s1(p, t) is increasing in t and in p (more










1− α log r −
1
1− α logAit + log v(p, t)
]
(19)
ei(p, t) = si(p, t)k(p, t)
[
1 + Z +
1
(1− α)(1− σ) logAit −
1
1− σ log v(p, t)
]
(20)
This model which incorporates both origin and destination heterogeneity would generate the same pre-
dictions as Proposition 1 for entry and concentration. There would be greater total entry from high p origins
owing to the origin heterogeneity, coupled with greater access to the faster growing destination. Concentra-
tion would rise over time for entrepreneurs from all origins, owing to faster entry growth into destination 1.
This would be more pronounced for the high p origins, so concentration would rise in p and p ∗ t. Entry
thresholds from high-p origins would be lower due to higher Ait (averaged across destinations) or lower v(p, t),
so the initial capital size result in part (a) of Proposition 2 would also go through. The average rate of growth
of firm size (where we average across destinations) would be higher for high-p origins, owing to their preferred
access to the faster growing destination.
The alternative model specified above can generate the predictions of our model relating to the dynamics
of entry, concentration, and firm size because the key si(p, t), Ait terms are exogenously specified to match
the endogenous evolution of these terms in our model. If firms from each origin locate at a unique set
of destinations, then our network-based model would not be distinguishable from the alternative model
with destination heterogeneity. In practice, however, firms from multiple origins will locate at the same
destination. Destination-time period dummies can then be included in the estimating equation. Conditional
on these dummies, the network model would imply that firms from higher-p origins will grow faster on average
because their growth is driven by changes in CTFP. In contrast, there is no relationship between firm growth
and p in the alternative model once destination-time period dummies are included because there is no longer
any variation within destinations.
One way to incorporate heterogeneity within destinations, without networks, would be to allow firm
growth to vary with the entrepreneur’s ability; this is not a feature of our model. A positive relationship
between p in the origin county and firm growth would then be obtained even within destination-time periods
if entrepreneurs from higher p origins have higher ability on average. However, this alternative model would
not explain why firms from higher p origins, with higher ability, nevertheless have lower initial capital. An
alternative model that may be considered, is that entrepreneurs do not have access to external credit and
have to be entirely self-financing (Song et al., 2011). Suppose that for some reason entrepreneurs from high
p counties have a higher shadow cost of capital, so entering firms start with lower capital size, and thereafter
grow faster owing to convergence forces akin to those in the Ramsey-Solow neoclassical growth model. This
model would not be able to explain the positive relationship between population density and either entry or
concentration — e.g., high p origins ought then to be associated with smaller entry flows. Nor would it be
able to explain why the positive relationship between firm size growth and population density is robust to




The primary data source that we use to test the model is the firm registration database maintained by
the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC). We have received special permission to use
the entire database, with firm and individual identifiers, for our research. The following information is
available for each firm: establishment date (and exit date if relevant), 4-digit sector, location, ownership-
type, registered capital (initial and subsequent changes), and the list of major shareholders and managers,
with their citizenship ID. As discussed, the birth county can be recovered from the citizenship ID and we
denote the firm’s legal representative as the “entrepreneur” when testing the model. Although the database
includes the universe of Chinese firms registered since 1980 in China, the analysis that follows is restricted
to private firms and covers the 1990-2009 period. We will see that the negative selection on ability predicted
by the model in the initial (explosive) growth phase starts to weaken by this point in time. Starting with a
relatively small number of private firms in 1990, there were 7.3 million registered private firms in 2009. Our
unique data thus allows us to trace the initial growth phase of private enterprise in China in its entirety. In
contrast, previous analyses of firms in China have relied on a publicly available database of manufacturing
firms with sales above a threshold level (5 million Yuan) over the shorter 1998-2008 period; e.g. Hsieh and
Klenow (2009), Song et al. (2011), Brandt et al. (2012), Aghion et al. (2015). The above-scale firms account
for less than 15% of all private firms in the registration database in 2008.
Although the registration database is well suited to examine entry, sectoral and location choice, and initial
capital investments, it is less useful for analyses of capital growth. Registered capital does change, but given
that these changes are self-reported and involve substantial administrative costs, they will not track perfectly
with changes in the firm’s assets over time. For the analysis of firm growth, we thus turn (separately) to the
industrial census, which was conducted in 1995, 2004, and 2008 and the SAIC’s inspection database, which
includes annual firm-level information on assets and sales from 2004 onwards.
To verify the quality of the SAIC administrative data, we linked firms by their ID’s across the industrial
census and the registration and inspection databases. The correlation in firm assets between the 2008 indus-
trial census and the inspection database is 0.63. The correlation in the total number of firms, by sector and
birth county of the entrepreneurs, in the 2008 industrial census and the registration database is 0.85. The
SAIC data are reported by firms. The industrial census information is collected by enumerators. Despite
the fact that the data are collected independently, there is a relatively high degree of consistency across the
different firm-level data sources that we use in the analysis.
The discussion in the preceding section indicates that the model generates testable predictions that
distinguish it from alternative explanations. To test these predictions, however, there must be sufficient
variation in population density across counties. Figure 3 plots population density across Chinese counties,
excluding counties below a threshold density.26 The population density in this figure, and in all the analyses,
is derived from the 1982 population census. This is before the first wave of privatization in the early 1990’s
26Population density is measured in units of 10,000 people per square km. The threshold density is set at 0.002; i.e. 20 people
for square km. This excludes sparsely populated regions such as Western China, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet, which supply few
entrepreneurs, from the analysis.
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and the accompanying rural-urban labor migration.27 There is substantial variation in this pre-determined
measure of social connectedness, which ranges from 20 to 1000 people per square km across counties. We
will see below that this variation is sufficient to test the model’s predictions with a high degree of statistical
confidence. Note that while we focus on the county-born entrepreneurs to test the model, the empirical
analysis will place no restrictions on where firms locate; there are 3,235 counties and urban districts where
firms locate in our data. Moreover, the relationship between population density and the model’s outcomes
for entrepreneurs born in cities will serve as a useful placebo test. Because social connectedness is not
increasing in population density in cities, we do not expect to validate the predictions of the model with
these entrepreneurs.
Figure 3. Population Density across Counties
Population Density
Source: 1982 population census.
4.2 Evidence on Firm Entry
The model predicts that firm entry is (i) increasing in origin county social connectedness at each point in
time, (ii) increasing over time, and (iii) increasing more steeply in social connectedness over time. This is a
statement about the flow of firms rather than the stock, and so we will measure entry in five-year windows
over the 1990-2009 period. Figure 4 reports nonparametric estimates of the relationship between the entry
of firms from each birth county and 1982 population density, our measure of social connectedness, in that
county in each time period. The entry patterns in the figure are consistent with the model’s predictions, with
the parametric estimates that follow providing statistical support for each prediction.28
Table 4, Columns 1-4 report parametric estimates corresponding to Figure 4, separately by time period.
This allows us to test the prediction that entry is increasing in birth county population density at each point in
27The advantage of using a predetermined measure of social connectedness in the analysis is that it avoids the possibility
that changes in population density in later time periods are generated by endogenously determined network-based migration.
Nevertheless, as documented in Appendix Figure C.1 using successive rounds of the population census, the ranking of counties
with respect to population density is invariant over time.
28Appendix Figure C.2 reports the corresponding nonparametric relationship between population density in the birth county
and the stock of firms (measured at the end of each time period). The predictions of the model apply to both firm entry; i.e. the
flow and the stock of firms. In practice, however, the stock will also take account of exits, which play no role in the model. We
see in Figure C.2 that the model’s predictions for the stock of firms go through as well, despite the exits.
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Source: SAIC registration database and 1982 population census.
time. Although we have shown that population density is positively correlated with social connectedness in a
county, it could potentially be correlated with other origin characteristics that directly determine the model’s
outcomes. As discussed, origin heterogeneity and, more generally, any non-network explanation cannot
generate all the results of our model. However, origin heterogeneity can explain the entry results. Population
density is positively associated with the county’s population and a larger population is mechanically associated
with greater entry. Counties with higher population densities also have more educated populations, based
on literacy rates from the 1982 census. If education is a proxy for ability, then there will be greater entry in
more educated counties if there is positive selection on ability into entrepreneurship. Finally, the traditional
occupational structure in the county could determine the propensity to enter business. We thus include
1982 population, 1982 literacy, and the 1982 occupational structure (measured by the agriculture share
and industry share, with services as the excluded category) in an augmented specification of the estimating
equation in Table 4, Columns 5-8. The estimated coefficients on the additional regressors (not reported)
are all statistically significant. Nevertheless, the coefficient on the birth county population density variable
remains positive, as predicted by the model, and is highly significant in each time period. Notice also that
the mean of the dependent variable and the population density coefficient are increasing across time periods,
in line with predictions (ii) and (iii) above. Formal tests of these predictions are reported later in this section.
An important alternative explanation for the model’s predictions is that there is heterogeneity across des-
tinations, with entrepreneurs born in higher population density birth counties having access to faster growing
destinations. Given that firms from multiple origin counties will enter each destination, we can flexibly ac-
commodate this alternative by including destination-time period dummies in the estimating equation. But
first we check whether firms from higher population density counties indeed select destinations that receive
more entrants overall (owing to geography, local infrastructure, or agglomeration effects). The dependent
variable in Table 5 is a synthetic measure of entry for each birth county in each time period, which is con-
structed as the weighted average of total entry (from all other origins) across all the sector-locations where
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Table 4. Firm Entry and Population Density
Dependent variable: number of entering firms
Time period: 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth county
population density 0.030*** 0.186*** 0.622*** 1.060*** 0.013*** 0.092*** 0.289*** 0.448***
(0.003) (0.018) (0.055) (0.088) (0.003) (0.013) (0.035) (0.052)
Mean of dependent
variable 0.031 0.208 0.787 1.560 0.031 0.208 0.787 1.560
Control variable No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624
Note: number of entering firms from each birth county in each time period is measured in thousands.
Population density is measured in units of 10,000 people per square km, and then converted to Z-score.
Control variables include population, education and occupation distribution in the birth county.
Population is measured in millions and education is measured by the percent of the population that is literate.
Occupation distribution is measured as the share of workers in the birth county in agriculture and industry. Service is the excluded
category.
Number of firms is obtained from the SAIC registration database and population density, population, education and the occupation
distribution are derived from the 1982 population census.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
firms from that birth county locate. The weight on each sector-location in a given time period is the fraction
of entrants from the birth county who locate there. We see in Table 5, in contrast with Table 4, that there
is no relationship between population density in the birth county and our synthetic measure of total entry
in the destinations where firms located. Indeed, the coefficient on population density is negative in the first
three time periods (and statistically significant in the first period). Entrepreneurs from higher population
density birth counties do not locate in faster growing destinations.
As a robustness exercise to reinforce this point, we include sector fixed effects and location fixed effects in
the estimating equation in Table 6. This equation is estimated separately in each time period and so the fixed
effects capture the changing fortunes of sectors and locations over time.29 Birth county population density
continues to have a positive and significant effect on entry in each time period in Table 6. A comparison of
the results obtained with the specification in Table 4, Columns 5-8, and the specification in Table 6 indicates
that the inclusion of the fixed effects actually increases the point estimates. Consistent with the results in
Table 5, this indicates that entrepreneurs born in high population density counties select sectors and locations
that had relatively low total entry (from all origins) on average.
4.3 Evidence on Concentration
The model predicts that sectoral concentration of the stock of firms, measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman
Index (HHI), is (i) increasing in origin county social connectedness at each point in time, (ii) increasing over
time, and (iii) increasing more steeply in social connectedness over time. As with firm entry, we measure social
connectedness by birth county population density, restricting attention to entrepreneurs born in counties.
Figure 5a reports nonparametric estimates of the relationship between sectoral concentration at the two-digit
level and 1982 population density in the birth county in five-year intervals from 1994 to 2009. The HHI is
29Entry in Table 6 is measured at the birth county-sector-location level in each time period. The number of entrants is
multiplied by the county-specific product of the number of sectors and the number of locations so that the dependent variable
reflects average entry at the level of the county.
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Table 5. Synthetic Entry and Population Density
Dependent variable: synthetic entry
Time period: 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth county population density -0.012*** -0.001 -0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
Constant 0.351* 2.833*** 6.353*** 4.946***
(0.191) (0.905) (1.197) (0.951)
Observations 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624
Note: synthetic entry (in thousands) in each time period is measured by the weighted average of total entry (from all origins excluding
the birth county) across all sector-locations for a given birth county. The weight on a given sector-location is the fraction of total entrants
from the county who located at that sector-location in that time period.
Control variables include population, education and occupation distribution in that birth county.
Birth county characteristics, including population density, are derived from the 1982 population census. Number of entrants obtained
from the SAIC registration database.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table 6. Firm Entry and Population Density (with sector and location fixed effects)
Dependent variable: number of entering firms
Time period: 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth county population density 0.014** 0.118*** 0.382*** 0.575***
(0.006) (0.037) (0.101) (0.126)
Mean of dependent variable 0.0725 0.483 1.673 3.024
Observations 1,085,169 1,085,169 1,085,169 1,085,169
Note: firm entry (in thousands) measured at the birth county-time period-sector-location level.
For a given birth county, all sectors and locations that ever have entrants are included in all time periods (assigned zero entry where
necessary). To adjust for differences in the number of sectors and locations across birth counties, the number of entrants is multiplied by
the number of sectors × the number of locations.
Control variables include population, education and occupation distribution in the birth county.
Standard errors clustered at the birth county level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
based on the stock of existing firms (net of exits) and is adjusted for the fact that measured concentration
could vary with the number of firms and the number of sectors just by chance, using a normalization derived
in Appendix B.30 The adjusted HHI is evidently increasing in population density at each point in time and
increasing over time, although it is difficult to visually assess whether the slope of the relationship gets steeper
over time.
While firms choose between sectors in the model without regard to location, it is possible that the network
spillovers are (in part) geographically constrained. If that is the case, then the model’s predictions for sectoral
concentration apply, without modification, to spatial concentration (within sectors) for firms that are located
outside their birth county.31 Figure 5b reports nonparametric estimates of the relationship between spatial
concentration, within one-digit sectors, and population density in the birth county in five-year intervals. As
30Previous attempts to examine the spatial distribution of production; e.g. Ellison and Glaeser (1997), Duranton and Overman
(2005), have also taken account of this feature of all concentration statistics.
31The choice between locating inside or outside the birth county is more complicated because transportation costs are obviously
lower when the entrepreneur chooses to stay back home. This home bias could be stronger in higher population density birth
counties, while at the same time firms from those counties that locate elsewhere could be more spatially concentrated.
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(b) Spatial Concentration
Source: SAIC registration database and 1982 population census.
Sectoral concentration is measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) across two-digit sectors, divided by the expected HHI that
would be obtained by random assignment, given the stock of firms and the number of sectors at each point in time.
Spatial concentration, within one-digit sectors, is measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) across destination locations (outside
the birth county) divided by the expected HHI that would be obtained by random assignment, given the stock of firms and number of
destination locations at each point in time.
with the analysis of sectoral concentration, the spatial concentration within each sector for a given birth county
is based on the stock of firms (net of exits) and is adjusted for the number of firms that are located outside
the birth county and the number of external destinations, which would generate variation in the measured
HHI just by chance.32 Matching the predictions of the model, the spatial HHI is evidently (i) increasing
in birth county population density in each time period, (ii) increasing over time, and (iii) increasing more
steeply over time.
Table 7 reports parametric estimates corresponding to Figure 5a and Figure 5b. Population density in
the birth county has a positive and significant effect on (adjusted) sectoral and spatial concentration at each
point in time. The mean of the dependent variable and the population density coefficient are increasing over
time, in line with predictions (ii) and (iii), which we test formally below.33
Table 8 formally tests the model’s predictions for changes over time and for changes in the birth county
population density effect over time with all three outcomes; i.e. firm entry, sectoral concentration, and spatial
concentration. Data from all time periods are pooled and the estimating equation now includes birth county
population density, time period, and the interaction of these variables. To preserve space, we only report
the coefficient on the time period variable and the interaction coefficient. Restricting the sample to county-
born entrepreneurs in Table 8, Columns 1-3, the time period coefficient and the interaction coefficient are
positive and significant with the number of entrants, sectoral concentration, and spatial concentration as the
32To maintain consistency across time periods, we only include birth county-sectors that have multiple entrants in all time
periods. This is not a constraint in the sectoral analysis because all birth counties have multiple entrants in each time period.
33The discussion on alternative explanations indicates that origin heterogeneity can generate the patterns of entry predicted
by our model. Origin heterogeneity is less of a concern with the analysis of concentration. Nevertheless, we verify that the
concentration results are robust to the inclusion of the additional birth county characteristics in Appendix Table D.2. The results
are essentially the same as in Table 7, except that the population density coefficient is increasing monotonically over time even
with sectoral concentration as the dependent variable. Recall from Proposition 1 that the HHI cannot increase beyond a point.
This might explain why the population density coefficient flattens out after 1999 in Columns 1-4 of Table 7, but not in Appendix
Table D.2 where it is substantially smaller in size.
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Table 7. Sectoral and Spatial Concentration and Population Density
Dependent variable: adjusted HHI across sectors adjusted HHI across locations
Year: 1994 1999 2004 2009 1994 1999 2004 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth county
population density 0.224*** 0.754*** 0.773*** 0.767*** 0.024** 0.121*** 0.301*** 0.524***
(0.022) (0.051) (0.052) (0.059) (0.012) (0.018) (0.036) (0.056)
Mean of dependent
variable 1.039 2.839 4.622 6.065 0.941 1.019 1.319 1.820
Observations 1,622 1,624 1,624 1,624 5,479 15,132 23,753 26,784
Note: sectoral concentration measured across two-digit sectors and spatial concentration, within one-digit sectors, is measured across des-
tination locations (outside the birth county). Concentration statistics are adjusted for expected concentration due to random assignment.
Sector fixed effects included in the regression with spatial HHI as the dependent variable.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
dependent variables, as predicted by the model. As a placebo test, we restrict the sample to entrepreneurs
born in urban districts in Table 8, Columns 4-6. Population density is not positively associated with social
connectedness in cities and thus we do not expect to find support for the model’s predictions with this set
of entrepreneurs. The time period coefficient and the interaction coefficient are both positive and significant
with entry as the dependent variable but, as discussed, many alternative models can generate this result
without a role for birth county networks. The model’s predictions for concentration are less easy to explain
away. Reassuringly, the interaction coefficient for the city-born entrepreneurs is negative and significant with
sectoral concentration as the dependent variable and statistically indistinguishable from zero with spatial
concentration as the dependent variables, contrary to the predictions of our model.
4.4 Evidence on Firm Size
The model predicts that the ability and the initial capital of the marginal entrant is (i) decreasing in birth
county social connectedness at each point in time, (ii) decreasing over time, and (iii) decreasing more steeply
in social connectedness over time. If the negative selection on ability that accompanies a stronger network
dominates the positive productivity effect of that network for inframarginal firms, then the preceding pre-
dictions apply to the average entrant as well. However, only the positive network productivity effects are
relevant for post-entry growth rates of firm size.
Figure 6a reports the relationship between a measure of ability, based on education, of the marginal
entrepreneur and population density in his birth county. It is standard practice to proxy for ability with
education. In a developing economy, the level of education will vary across birth cohorts and in the cross-
section (across birth counties) for the same level of ability, depending on the supply of schooling. Our measure
of ability is thus the entrepreneurs’ percentile rank in his birth county-birth cohort education distribution.34
The marginal entrant is the entrepreneur who is placed at the bottom one percentile of the ability distribution
34The education distribution is constructed in each county for birth cohorts from 1920 to 1989 in five-year intervals, based on
data from the 2000 population census. Each entrepreneur is assigned to a birth cohort interval based on his birth year, which is
available from the registration database, and his position in the relevant education distribution is determined on the basis of his
education, which is also obtained from the registration database. The coverage for the education variable is not complete in the
SAIC registration database, with a significant minority of entrepreneurs not reporting this information. This has no bearing on
the complementary analysis of firm size, which includes all registered firms.
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Table 8. Entry, Concentration, and Population Density (time and interaction effects)
Birth place: county city district
Dependent variable: number ofentrants sectoral HHI spatial HHI
number of
entrants sectoral HHI spatial HHI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time period 0.517*** 1.686*** 0.528*** 0.661*** 0.319*** 2.286***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.008) (0.082)
Birth place population
density × time period 0.353*** 0.165*** 0.149*** 0.355*** -0.024*** 0.055
(0.029) (0.019) (0.016) (0.041) (0.004) (0.045)
Observations 6,496 6,494 71,148 3,224 3,222 20,285
Note: the estimating equation includes, in addition, birthplace population density and a constant term.
Number of entering firms from each birth county in each time period is measured in thousands.
Sectoral concentration measured by Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) across two-digit sectors divided by the expected HHI that would
be obtained by random assignment.
Spatial concentration, within one-digit sectors, is measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) across destination locations (outside
the birth county) divided by the expected HHI that would be obtained by random assignment. Sector fixed effects are included in this
specification.
Population density is measured in units of 10,000 people per square km, and then converted to Z-score.
Time period is an ordinal variable taking value from 1 to 4 corresponding to successive five-year time windows over the 1990-2009 period.
Number of entrants and concentration statistics are derived from the SAIC registration database and population density is derived from
the 1982 population census.
Sector fixed effects included in the regression with spatial HHI as the dependent variable.
Standard errors clustered at birthplace level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
among entering entrepreneurs in each birth county-sector-time period. We see in Figure 6a that the marginal
entrant’s measured ability declines over time; from around the 70th percentile of his birth county-birth cohort
education distribution in the 1990-1994 period to just around the 40th percentile in the 2005-2009 period. The
relationship between the marginal entrant’s ability and population density is also negative in each time period
and grows steeper over time.35 Notice, however, that there is a bottoming out by the last, 2005-2009, period.
Our model is only designed to capture firm dynamics up to this point, which is why the empirical analysis
does not extend beyond 2009. For the analysis of negative selection that follows, and for the structural
estimation, the analysis period will be restricted even further to the 1990-2004 period.
Figure 6b reports complementary nonparametric estimates of the relationship between marginal initial
capital, measured in logs, and 1982 population density in the birth county in five-year windows over the 1990-
2009 period. Marginal initial capital is defined as the bottom one percentile of the initial capital distribution
at the birth county-sector-time period level.36 As predicted by the model, marginal initial capital is decreasing
over time and decreasing in birth county population density in each time period.37
Notice from Figure 6b that the decline in initial capital with birth county population density does not
grow steeper over time (as implied by the model). One reason why this might be the case is because marginal
initial capital within birth county-sector-time periods is averaged across sectors in the figure. Although this is
35Appendix Table D.3 reports parametric estimates corresponding to Figure 6a, separately in each time period. These esti-
mates indicate that birth county population density has a negative and significant effect on marginal education among entering
entrepreneurs at each point in time.
36The initial capital for a firm is determined by its initial registered capital, which can be recovered from the SAIC registration
database.
37Appendix Table D.3 reports parametric estimates corresponding to Figure 6b, separately by time period. The population
density coefficient is negative and significant in each time period.
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(b) Marginal Initial Capital
Source: SAIC registration database and 1982 population census.
The entrepreneur’s ability is measured by his percentile rank in his birth county- birth cohort education distribution (obtained from the
2000 population census). The marginal entrepreneur is defined as the individual at the bottom one percentile of the ability distribution
among entering entrepreneurs in a given birth county-sector-time period.
Marginal initial capital is defined as the bottom one percentile of the initial capital distribution at the birth county-sector-time period
level.
not a feature of our model, the capital requirement will vary across sectors, and this must be accounted for in
the empirical analysis. Table 9 allows for this by studying the change in the ability of entering entrepreneurs
and their capital investments over time, within birth county-sectors. The analysis is restricted to the 1990-
2004 period because our measure of marginal ability and initial capital both bottom out (and flatten out)
in the 2005-2009 period in Figures 6a and 6b. We see in Table 9, Column 1, which includes birth county-
sector fixed effects, that the marginal entrant is drawn from lower down in his birth county-cohort education
distribution over time and that this decline in our measure of ability is significantly steeper for entrants from
higher population density counties, as predicted by the model. Table 9, Columns 2-3 use the distribution
of initial capital (in logs) in each entering cohort of firms, in five-year windows over the 1990-2004 period,
to identify the marginal entrant (the bottom one percentile) and the average entrant by birth county-sector.
Including birth county-sector fixed effects in the estimating equation, we see that both the marginal entrant’s
initial capital and the average entrant’s initial capital are decreasing significantly over time. Although the
coefficient on the time period-birth county population density interaction is also negative and significant with
the marginal entrant’s initial capital as the dependent variable, the interaction coefficient is positive (albeit
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant) with average initial capital as the dependent variable.
The analysis of firm size thus far has not accounted for location choices, and the possibility that variation
in these choices across birth counties could be driving the results. Table 9, Columns 4-5 thus includes location
fixed effects, in addition to birth county-sector fixed effects in the estimating equation.38 Both marginal initial
capital and average initial capital are declining significantly over time, as in Columns 2-3. Moreover, the
coefficient on the time period-birth county population density interaction is now negative and significant
38The marginal entrant’s initial capital and the average entrant’s initial capital are now based on the distribution of capital
in each birth county-sector-destination-time period. The sample in Columns 4-5 is restricted to birth county-sector-destinations
with entrants in the initial period. Similarly, the sample in Columns 2-3 is restricted to birth county-sectors with entrants in the
initial period.
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with both dependent variables, as predicted by the model. As with the analysis of firm entry, accounting for
location effects only strengthens our results.










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time period -18.532*** -0.882*** -0.115*** -0.655*** -0.109***
(0.409) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Birth county population
density × time period -1.040*** -0.028** 0.002 -0.069*** -0.022***
(0.394) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Mean of dependent variable 49.36 -1.744 -0.401 -1.223 -0.374
Origin-sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 21,028 43,579 43,579 46,417 46,417
Note: the marginal entrepreneur is defined as the individual at the bottom one percentile of the ability (adjusted education) distribution
among entering entrepreneurs in a given birth county-sector-time period.
Initial capital (in million Yuan) is measured in logs. Marginal initial capital defined by the bottom one percentile of the initial capital
distribution at the birth county-sector-time period level. Average initial capital is the mean of the distribution.
Time period is an ordinal variable taking value from 1 to 3 corresponding to successive five-year time windows over the 1990-2004 period.
Education and initial capital are obtained from the SAIC registration database and birth county population density is derived from the
1982 population census.
Standard errors clustered at birth county-sector level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Conditional on having entered, the model predicts that firms from higher population density counties will
grow faster. As noted, the registration data are not suitable for computing growth rates because the firm’s
registered capital does not track perfectly with changes in its assets. Information on firm assets is available,
however, in the industrial census and the SAIC inspection database. The industrial census reports firm
assets in the 1995, 2004, and 2008 rounds. The SAIC inspection database has reasonable coverage from 2004
onwards. We can thus compute the average annual growth rate over the 1995-2004 and 2004-2008 periods
with the industrial census and, to be consistent, over the 2004-2008 period with the inspection data.39 Figure
7 reports asset growth, separately in the 1995-2004 period and the 2004-2008 period, based on the industrial
census. The average annual growth of assets is increasing in population density in each time period and
increasing over time, as predicted by the model, in contrast with the patterns that we observe in the data
for initial firm size.
Table 10, Columns 1 and 3 report estimates from a parametric specification corresponding to Figure 7,
while Columns 2 and 4 add location fixed effects and the firm’s initial capital to the estimating equation.
Recall that one alternative explanation for why firms from high population density birth counties start small
and then grow faster is mechanical convergence (with initial size being accidentally determined). What we
observe, instead, is that firms that are larger to begin with, subsequently grow faster. Table 10, Columns
5-6 repeats the analysis with SAIC inspection data, which include all sectors (not just manufacturing, as in
39The average annual growth between period t and t′ is computed as the difference in log assets in t′ and t divided by t′ − t.
Although there are no exits in the model, this is a feature of the data. In practice, firms with low profit levels – the young and
the less able – are more likely to exit. This selective exit, based on the profit level, does not bias our estimates because growth
rates in the model are determined entirely by changes in CTFP that apply equally to all active firms in the network.
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Source: Industrial census (1995, 2004, 2008) and 1982 population census.
Firm-level average annual growth of assets is averaged up to the birth county-sector level in each time period.
the industrial census).40 The consistent finding across specifications is that population density in the birth
county has a positive and significant effect on firm growth.41
Table 10. Growth of Assets and Population Density
Dependent variable: average annual growth of assets
Source: industrial census industrial census inspection data
Time period: 1995-2004 2004-2008 2004-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Birth county population density 0.006*** 0.007* 0.004** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Initial capital – 0.002*** – 0.001*** – 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean of dependent variable 0.0528 0.0557 0.133 0.136 0.106 0.110
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,517 5,664 31,234 64,258 18,701 43,470
Note: firm-level average annual growth of assets is averaged up to the birth county-sector level in specifications with sector fixed effects
and to the birth county-sector-destination level in specifications with sector fixed effects and location fixed effects.
Initial capital (in million Yuan) obtained from the SAIC registration database and birth county population density is derived from the
1982 population census.
Standard errors clustered at birth county level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
40Data coverage for seven provinces is poor with the inspection data and these provinces are thus dropped from the analysis.
41A pooled regression (not reported) which combines industrial census data over both time periods indicates, in addition, that
firm growth is increasing significantly over time. While our model can explain this result, it must be augmented, perhaps by
introducing credit constraints, to explain why initial capital has a positive and significant effect on firm growth.
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4.5 Testing the Mechanism
In our model, initial entry generates subsequent entry through a compounding network effect over time,
which is reinforced by the channelling of new entrants into particular sectors or locations. To examine this
fundamental relationship more formally, within a particular sector-location, consider a simplified version of
our model with a single sector. Retaining the notation of our model, the entry equation then reduces to
et = k[B + Cθ(p)nt−1] (21)
This equation can be solved recursively, starting from period 1, to derive a closed-form solution for the
relationship between entry in period t, et, and initial entry or, equivalently, the initial stock of firms, n0,
which we treat as exogenous in the model:
et = k[B + Cθ(p)n0][1 + kCθ(p)]
t−1 (22)
From the equation above, initial entry, n0, has a positive effect on subsequent entry, et, with this effect
growing steeper over time because 1 + kCθ(p) > 1. Moreover, the effect of n0 at any date t is increasing in p
because θ(p) is increasing in p.
We test this relationship in Table 11a by estimating the effect of initial entry on subsequent entry within
birth county-sector-locations. Initial entry is measured in the 1990-1994 period, when private firms were just
starting to emerge, and subsequent entry is measured separately in 2000-2004 and 2005-2009. The estimating
equation includes birth county-sector fixed effects.42 The benchmark specification, reported in Columns 1-
2, includes, in addition, a measure of generalized location-based agglomeration: the total number of initial
entrants regardless of their birth county, in each sector-location. The number of initial entrants from the birth
county in a given sector-location has a positive and significant effect on the number of subsequent entrants;
one additional initial entrant generates seven additional entrants in the 2000-2004 period and nine additional
entrants in the 2005-2009 period.43 Conditional on the number of initial entrants from the birth county, the
total number of initial entrants in a given sector-location has no effect on subsequent entry from that birth
county in that sector-location. This last result provides empirical support for the key assumption in the
model that the birth county is the domain within business networks are organized in China and that these
networks operate independently. It also provides support for the assumption that individual networks cannot
influence the price of the product. If the members of the network could collude (depending on their market
share) or there were limits to market size, then the total number of entrants, conditional on the number of
entrants from the birth county, would also be relevant.44
42All locations which had a positive number of entrants by 2000-2004 and 2005-2009, respectively, for a given birth county-sector
are included in the estimating equation.
43Although we assume that the network increases the firm’s productivity, an alternative explanation is that it captures economic
rents. Fisman et al. (2018) document favoritism based on hometown ties in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. A business network
located at a particular destination could similarly have preferred access to subsidized government capital or infrastructure if the
local government official belongs to the same hometown. While these social ties might confer a temporary advantage, resulting
in additional entry, it will not persist because government officials are frequently rotated precisely to avoid such corruption.
Based on data from city yearbooks and the online CV’s of government officials, we estimate that the median (mean) term-length
for a city mayor in China is 4 (3.7) years. Government favoritism thus cannot explain the long-term effect of initial entry on
subsequent entry that we observe in Table 11a.
44If all firms from the same origin collude, but there is competition across (origin-based) networks at the destination, then
we would expect to see a negative effect of entry from other origins. While pricing may be non-competitive in China (see, for
example, Brooks et al. (2016)), the origin-based networks do not appear to be directly associated with these distortions.
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Table 11a. The Effect of Initial Entry on Subsequent Entry (within birth place)
Dependent variable: subsequent entrants from the birth place
Birth place: county county city district
Time period: 2000-2004 2005-2009 2000-2004 2005-2009 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial entrants from the birth place 7.120*** 8.935*** 5.239*** 5.796*** 7.830*** 6.994***
(0.711) (0.972) (1.065) (1.356) (0.959) (0.982)
All initial entrants at the location 0.054 -0.020 – – – –
(0.050) (0.057)
Initial entrants from the birth place ×
birth place population density – – 1.361** 2.262** -0.073 -0.437**
(0.619) (0.991) (0.240) (0.220)
Mean of dependent variable 3.065 3.128 3.065 3.128 4.001 3.515
Observations 413,452 804,918 413,452 804,918 313,520 449,207
Table 11b. The Effect of Initial Entry on Subsequent Entry (within clan)
Dependent variable: subsequent entrants from the clan
Time period: 2000-2004 2005-2009 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial entrants from the clan 3.275*** 4.082*** 2.434*** 2.713***
(0.330) (0.355) (0.315) (0.310)
All initial entrants at the location
from the birth county 0.031*** 0.051*** 0.013 0.008
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
Initial entrants from the clan × birth
county population density – – 0.641** 1.071***
(0.267) (0.334)
Initial entrants from the birth county
× birth county population density – – 0.013* 0.031**
(0.007) (0.014)
Mean of dependent variable 1.372 1.392 1.372 1.392
Observations 888,331 1,743,760 888,331 1,743,760
Note: number of entrants is measured at the (two-digit) sector-destination level.
Initial entry is derived over the 1990-1994 period.
Clan is defined by the same surname group and the same birth county.
All specifications include birth place-sector fixed effects.
Number of entrants is obtained from the SAIC registration database and birth place population density is derived from the 1982 population
census.
Standard errors clustered at birthplace-sector level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
While the model predicts that initial entry will have a compounding effect on future entry when networks
are active, it also generates the stronger prediction that the effect of initial entry should be larger for higher
population density birth counties. We test this prediction in Table 11a, Columns 3-4 by interacting the
number of initial entrants from the birth county, within sector-locations, with its population density. The
interaction coefficient is positive and significant, as predicted by the model, for entry in 2000-2004 and in
2005-2009 as the dependent variable.45 As a placebo test, we restrict the sample in Table 11a, Columns
45Although we assume in the model that initial entry is randomly assigned, entrepreneurs will, in practice, locate relatively close
to their home counties. The persistence in this distance effect could explain the correlation between initial entry and subsequent
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5-6 to entrepreneurs who are born in cities. Population density is not positively associated with social
connectedness in cities and thus we do not expect the interaction of initial entry and population density in
their birth locations to have a positive effect on subsequent entry. Initial entry has a positive and significant
effect on subsequent entry, in 2000-2004 and 2005-2009. However, the coefficient on the interaction with
birthplace population density is negative (and significant with entry in 2005-2009 as the dependent variable).
We remain agnostic about the domain of the hometown network in this paper; i.e. whether it covers
the entire birth county or the clan within the county. As discussed in Section 2.2, if clan concentration is
not decreasing too steeply in population density, our results go through. Although the clan composition of
the birth county population is unavailable, the clan affiliation of the entrepreneurs in the SAIC registration
database can be inferred from their birth counties and surnames (Peng, 2004). We thus repeat the preceding
analysis at the level of the clan to assess empirically whether it is, in fact, the domain of the network.
To derive the relationship between initial entry and subsequent entry when the clan constitutes the domain
of the network, consider a county with two clans, a majority clan M and a minority clan m, with demographic
weights ζM ≡ µ(> 12), ζm ≡ 1− µ. Assume that economic cooperation occurs only within clans, and that the
stock of potential entrepreneurs is partitioned across the two clans in proportion to their relative sizes. The
entry equation for clan j ∈ {M,m} is then
ejt = kζj [B + Cθ(ζj , p)nj0][1 + kζjCθ(ζj , p)]
t−1 (23)
where, following the discussion in Section 2.2, network quality θ(ζj , p) is increasing in ζj and p. Initial entry,
nj0, has a positive effect on subsequent entry, with this effect growing stronger over time. In addition, if clan
composition in a county is independent of p, then it follows that the effect of nj0 on entry at any subsequent
date t is increasing in p.
We test the preceding prediction in Table 11b by estimating the effect of initial entry in the 1990-1994
period on subsequent entry, separately in 2000-2004 and 2005-2009, at the clan-sector-location level. The
estimating equation includes birth county-sector fixed effects as well as the total number of initial entrants
from the birth county into that sector-location (to allow for the possibility that network spillovers extend
beyond the clan). The coefficient on the number of initial entrants, at the level of the clan and the county, is
positive and significant in Table 11b, Columns 1-2, although the former is an order of magnitude larger. As
predicted, the initial effects grow larger over time; i.e. from 2000-2004 to 2005-2009. Columns 3-4 interact
initial entry with the population density of the birth county. The initial effects are larger for higher population
density birth counties, at the level of the clan and the county, in 2000-2004 and in 2005-2009.
The results in Table 11b indicate that spillovers are concentrated within the clan, although they do
extend to a limited extent beyond its boundaries to other entrepreneurs in the same county from other
entry. We address this concern in Appendix Table D.4 by including the distance from the birth county to the destination
location under consideration in the estimating equation. The coefficient on the distance variable is negative and significant, but
the remaining coefficients are unaffected by the inclusion of this variable. An additional concern is that if locations that were
initially selected by entrepreneurs from high population density counties grew relatively fast, then this would explain why the
interaction of birth county population density and initial entry has a positive effect on subsequent entry. We address this concern
by implementing a test that is closely related to the test reported in Table 5. A synthetic variable is constructed to measure total
entry in subsequent periods (from all other origins) at the destinations where firms from a given birth county initially located.
The coefficient on the birth county population density variable in Appendix Table D.5 is small in magnitude and statistically
insignificant with synthetic entry in 2000-2004 and 2005-2009 as the dependent variables.
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Source: SAIC Registration database and 1982 population census.
Clan concentration measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) across surnames of entering entrepreneurs from a given birth
county, divided by the expected HHI that would be obtained by random assignment, given the number of entrants and the number of
surnames at each point in time.
clans. Assuming, for simplicity, that the spillovers operate exclusively within the clan, our model generates
predictions for the concentration of business activity within clans drawn from the same birth county, across
counties with different population densities and over time. With two clans, clan concentration among entering
entrepreneurs (measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index) will be locally montonically increasing in the








1 + kmCθ(m, p)
]t−1
(24)
Because the term in square brackets is greater than one, the model predicts clan concentration among entering
entrepreneurs will be increasing over time in all origin counties. If θ(ζj , p) is multiplicatively separable in ζj
and p, the term in square brackets is increasing in p, implying clan concentration among entering entrepreneurs
will be increasing in p at each date t. Figure 8 reports the relationship between the clan concentration of
entering entrepreneurs, measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index, and population density in their birth
county at each point in time. Clan concentration among entering entrepreneurs is increasing over time and
increasing in birth county population density at each point in time, precisely as our model of within-clan-
network-based cooperation would predict.46
5 Structural Estimation and Quantification
The model generates predictions for two independent outcomes: entry at the sector level and firm size.
Sector-specific entry is aggregated up to compute total entry and used to construct concentration statistics.
46Appendix Table D.6 reports parametric estimates corresponding to Figure 8, separately in each time period. These esti-
mates indicate that birth county population density has a positive and significant effect on clan concentration among entering
entrepreneurs at each point in time. A pooled regression (not reported), using all time periods, also indicates that clan concen-
tration is increasing over time.
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Firm-specific capital investment, together with the assumed distribution of ability in the population and
the endogenously generated pattern of entry, is used to derive average (and marginal) initial capital in each
birth county-sector. The structural estimation is thus based on two equations, with sector-specific entry
and average initial capital (by sector) for each birth county in each time period as the dependent variables.
We estimate both the benchmark version of the model, with myopic decision-making, as well as a variant
(presented in Appendix A) where entrepreneurs consider profits in the current period and the subsequent
period when making their entry decisision.
Based on the corresponding equations in the myopic version of the model, (8) and (14), and retaining its
notation, we estimate the following structural equations:
eci,t = G(α, σ, r, A0)kcsci,t−1 +
θ
(1− σ)(1− α)kcsci,t−1 · pnci,t−1 + uci,t (25)
logKaci,t = Jt(α, σ, r, A0, ft) +
θ(1− 2σ)
2(1− σ)(1− α)pnci,t−1 + vci,t (26)
eci,t measures the number of entrants and logK
a
ci,t measures average initial capital (in logs) for birth county
c and sector i in time period t. uci,t, vci,t reflect measurement error in entry and capital, respectively. nci,t−1
is the stock of firms from that birth county that are already established in that sector at the beginning
of the time period. sci,t−1 denotes the share of sector i in the stock of firms originating from county c at
t − 1. kc measures the number of potential entrepreneurs from the birth county. The model assumed kc
was equal across birth counties and time periods. For the structural estimation, the number of potential
entrepreneurs in each birth county is derived from the 1990 population census, based on the characteristics of
actual entrepreneurs when they established their firms (which is derived, in turn, from the SAIC registration
database).47 Capital is measured in the model in physical units, whereas in the data it is measured in
monetary units. The mapping from physical units to monetary units changes over time owing to changes in
the price of capital goods. This is especially relevant in the structural estimation because the objective is
to match predicted and actual firm size in each time period. ft thus represents the price of capital goods in
period t. We parameterize the θ(p) function to be increasing linearly in p: θ(p) = θp, with the restriction
that θ(0) = 0. The network effect is thus represented by a single parameter, θ.
The structural equations are linear in observed variables; (i) kcsci,t−1 (ii) kcsci,t−1 · pnci,t−1 (iii) pnci,t−1,
with four reduced-form coefficients.48 One of these coefficients, Jt, cannot be used to identify the struc-
tural parameters because ft is unobserved. This leaves three reduced-form coefficients and five structural
parameters: α, σ, r, A0, θ. We noted in Section 3 that the productivity channel and the credit channel for
the network effect cannot be separately identified. Although the model is parameterized to allow networks
to increase productivity, we remain agnostic about the specific channel through which the networks operate.
For the structural estimation, we specify that the network operates through the productivity channel as in
the model, setting r to 0.2 (which is in line with estimates of the average interest rate faced by Chinese
47We see in Appendix Figure C.3 that most entrepreneurs in the registration database have at least high school education and
that most were aged 25-44 when their firm was established. kc is thus specified to be the number of men born in county c, aged
25-44, with at least high school education, as reported in the 1990 population census.
48The functional forms for G(α, σ, r, A0) and Jt(α, σ, r, A0, ft) are obtained directly from (8) and (14), with the addition of the
separable ft term in the Jt function.
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firms).49 The productivity multiplier is set to one in all sectors; i.e. A0 = 1. As in the model, variation
in productivity across sectors (and origin counties) in the benchmark specification is generated entirely by
the network effect; exp(θp · nci,t−1). We thus abstract from variation in product prices, labor productivity,
government infrastructure, and agglomeration effects in the structural estimation, although we do estimate
an augmented model (as a robustness exercise) that allows for sector-level spillovers. The objective will be
to assess how well our parsimonious benchmark model is able to match the observed dynamics of entry and
firm size.
To accommodate differences in the capital requirement across sectors, we do, however, allow the α param-
eter, which measures the marginal returns to capital, to vary across four broad sector categories: high-tech
services, wholesale and retail services, manufacturing and transportation, and heavy industry (mining, elec-
tricity, and construction). This increases the number of structural equations to eight, given that there are
now two equations in each sector category, and the number of structural parameters to be estimated to six;
α1, α2, α3, α4, σ, θ. The structural parameters are estimated by matching on entry and average initial capital
in each birth county-sector-time period.50 Initial entry in each birth county-sector is based on the number of
entrants in 1990-1994 and, if there is no entry in that time period, on the number of entrants in 1995-1999.
Sectors are defined at the one-digit level in the structural estimation to ensure that there is positive initial
entry in (almost) all birth county-sectors and the model is estimated over the 1995-2004 period; i.e. over two
time periods.
To estimate the structural parameters, we search for the set of parameters that minimize the distance
between the actual and the predicted entry and average initial capital; i.e. for which the sum of squared errors
over all birth county-sector-time periods is minimized. Parameter estimates, with bootstrapped standard
errors in parentheses, are reported for the benchmark model in Table 12, Column 1.51 The σ coefficient
lies between 0.5 and 1, satisfying the condition, derived in the model, which ensures that average initial
capital is decreasing in birth county population density. The adjustment from physical capital to capital in
monetary units, ft, appears additively in the Jt function and, thus, can be estimated separately in 1995-1999
(period 1) and 2000-2004 (period 2). Table 12, Column 2 reports estimates with the forward looking model,
derived in Appendix A. Entry must now be derived as the solution to a nonlinear equation, satisfying a fixed
point condition, in each birth county-sector-time period.52 Notice that the θ parameter declines substantially
when we allow for forward looking behavior, while remaining statistically and quantitatively significant. This
is because potential entrants require less of a “push” from the network when they take account of future
49In our model, r, is the sum of the real interest rate and the depreciation rate. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) assume that the real
interest rate is 0.05 in an economy, such as the U.S., with perfect financial markets and that the depreciation rate is 0.05. Using
the same production function as Hsieh-Klenow and data from the Chinese industrial census, Brandt et al. (2016) estimate the
real interest rate to be 0.15 in 1995 and 2004 and 0.18 in 2008. We thus set r to 0.2.
50Although the number of reduced form coefficients now exceeds the number of structural parameters, the model places
additional restrictions on the reduced form coefficients that must hold across sector categories. For example, the ratio of the
coefficients on kcsci,t−1 · pnci,t−1 and pnci,t−1 in (25) and (26), respectively, must be 2/(1 − 2σ) in each sector category. The
identification of the structural parameters is now more difficult to assess analytically and, hence, we verified that the parameters
continue to be (just) identified by estimating the model with different values of r. The point estimates of the structural parameters
do change in response, but the predicted entry and average initial capital (for each value of p) remain unchanged.
51When matching on entry and initial capital, we weight the error term by the reciprocal of the (bootstrapped) standard
deviation of the mean of each variable. The unweighted estimates are very similar to what we report in the table.
52The discount factor per year, δ is set to 0.8 when estimating the model with foresight. Because one time period is five years,
this works out to 0.82.5 = 0.56.
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benefits. Table 12, Column 3 reports estimates with an augmented model that allows for spillovers at the
sector level, regardless of the county of birth. This captures spillovers of the sort considered in endogenous
growth models, resulting from diffusion of R&D across firms in any given sector. An additional ni,t−1 term
is thus included in equations (25) and (26). Although the coefficient on ni,t−1, λ, is very precisely estimated,
notice that the θ coefficient is very similar in magnitude in Columns 1 and 3.
Table 12. Structural Estimates
Model: benchmark forward looking with sector-level spillovers
σ 0.775 0.776 0.777
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
θ 0.395 0.125 0.359
(0.054) (0.004) (0.011)
λ – – 0.00003
(0.000002)
α1 0.137 0.119 0.138
(0.009) (0.001) (0.007)
α2 0.189 0.179 0.194
(0.020) (0.001) (0.020)
α3 0.192 0.177 0.197
(0.011) (0.003) (0.016)
α4 0.236 0.226 0.240
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
f1 0.223 0.233 0.216
(0.004) (0.003) (0.016)
f2 0.189 0.208 0.184
(0.005) (0.003) (0.012)
Note: the parameters are estimated by matching on entry and average initial capital (in logs), measured at the birth county-sector-time
period level. When minimizing the sum of squared errors, the error term is weighted by the reciprocal of the bootstrapped standard
deviation of the mean of each variable.
The model is estimated over two time periods, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004, taking entry in the first period, 1990-1994, as given.
Sectors are defined at the one-digit level when measuring entry and capital, but the α parameter is estimated at the aggregate sector
level: (1) new technological services; (2) wholesale, retail and business service; (3) manufacturing and transportation; (4) heavy industry
(mining, electricity, and construction)
The discount factor per year δ is set to 0.8 in the forward looking model.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
Number of entrants and average initial capital are derived from the SAIC registration database and birth county population density is
derived from the 1982 population census.
Figure 9a assesses the goodness of fit of the benchmark model by comparing actual and predicted entry
across birth counties in each time period.53 The model that we estimate is extremely parsimonious, with
just six parameters. Nevertheless, it does a good job of predicting entry across nearly 2,000 birth counties
and over ten years. Figure 9b repeats this exercise with average initial capital and, once again, we see that
the model predicts variation across birth counties fairly accurately. Once the capital adjustment factor is
included in each time period, note that actual and predicted average initial capital will match on levels by
construction.
To formally test the goodness of fit of the model, we would want to compare predicted and actual outcomes
(entry and average initial capital) at each level of population density, p. Given the large number of counties,
with distinct values of p, we compare, instead, the estimated population density coefficient with actual and
predicted data (generated by each of the three models in Table 12). The dependent variable is either entry
53Birth county-sectors where initial entry commences in 1995-1999 are not included in this comparison.
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or average initial capital.54 Since the structural estimates are based on two time periods, the estimating
equation includes birth county population density and a binary time period variable, which takes the value
one in 2000-2004 and zero in 1995-1999. The estimated population density coefficients in Appendix Table
D.7a are statistically indistinguishable between actual data and data generated by the benchmark model.
Moreover, the benchmark model does a better job of matching the population density coefficient estimated
with actual data than both the forward looking model and the model that allows for additional sector-level
spillovers.
A more stringent test of the structural model is to assess its out of sample predictions. The model is
estimated over the 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 periods. Figure 10 compares actual and predicted entry and
sectoral concentration in the subsequent 2005-2009 period.55 The model does a good job of predicting firm
entry and sectoral concentration, although it does over-shoot at higher birth county population density levels.
As with the in-sample predictions, we independently assess the model’s ability to match the data by comparing
population density coefficients, estimated with actual data and model generated data in Appendix Table D.7b.
Because there is now a single period, 20005-2009, the estimating equation includes a single regressor; birth
county population density. The population density coefficients estimated with actual data and data generated
by the benchmark model are close in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable with firm entry as the
dependent variable. As with the in-sample predictions, the benchmark model does a better job of matching
the population density coefficient estimated with the actual data than either the forward looking model or the
model with sector-level spillovers. However, none of the models are quite as successful in predicting sectoral
concentration, with the benchmark model performing slightly worse than the other two models.
With a single θ parameter common to all birth counties and sectors in the model, cross-sectional variation
is generated by differences in population density and initial entry alone. Nevertheless, the model is able to
54Entry is measured at the birth county-time period level and average initial capital is measured at the birth county-sector-time
period level to be consistent with the tests of the model above.
55We cannot test the model’s ability to predict initial capital beyond the sample period because the mapping from physical
capital to capital in monetary units is unavailable.
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match the data quite well, across counties and sectors, even out of sample. The estimated parameters can
thus be used for counter-factual simulations. A major objective of our research is to quantify the role played
by community networks in the growth of private enterprise in China. This is accomplished by setting the θ
parameter to zero and then generating counter-factual entry and capital investment over the sample period.
The results of this exercise, with the benchmark model, are reported in Figure 11a. It is evident from
the figure that the number of entrants would have been substantially reduced in the absence of community
networks, particularly in higher population density birth counties. Based on our estimates, the total number
of entrants would have declined by 64% over the 1995-2004 period if the networks had not been active. In a
related counter-factual exercise, the total stock of capital in 2004 (taking account of the number of firms that
entered, their initial capital, and the subsequent growth in their capital) would have declined by 65% had
the networks been absent. Adjusting for the fact that our analysis is restricted to county-born entrepreneurs,
for whom the hometown networks are relevant, this amounts to a 40% decline in the number of entrants
and the stock of capital for the country as a whole.56 Figure 11b repeats the counter-factual entry analysis
with the augmented model that allows for sector-level spillovers. Notice that these spillovers have almost
no impact on entry, in contrast with the substantial impact that we estimate for the birth county-sector
spillovers. This indicates that origin-based networks constitute the main source of spillovers in China, rather
than the sector-based spillovers considered in the endogenous growth literature.
An important objective of industrial policy in any developing economy is to stimulate entrepreneurship.
It has been claimed that the government played a critical role in accelerating China’s growth by providing
firms with subsidized credit; e.g. Song et al. (2011), Wu (2016). In the absence of a market-based allocation
56Government infrastructure and prices, which are subsumed in A0, remain fixed in the counter-factual simulation. If the
network were shut down and the number of firms declined, then output (input) prices would increase (decrease). The resulting
increase in profits would encourage some additional firms to enter. In contrast, if government infrastructure and the growth of
the networks are complementary, then the removal of the networks would reduce the infrastructure level, generating a further
decline in the number of firms in the counter-factual scenario.
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mechanism, a natural question to ask is which firms should have been targeted for the subsidy. To answer
this question, we examine a counter-factual policy experiment in which all entering firms in the 1995-1999
period received credit at an interest rate of 0.15; i.e. with a subsidy of 0.05. This subsidy would have had
two effects; it would have induced additional firms to enter at the margin and it would have increased the
profit of all (marginal and infra-marginal) entrants. As observed in Figure 12a, the total profit increase
generated by the subsidy in 1995-1999 is less than the cost to the government in all birth counties. However,
the spillover effect of the one-time subsidy on profits in the subsequent 2000-2004 period is substantial (and
even larger than the direct effect on profits in high population density counties). This is because the credit
subsidy induces additional entry during 1995-1999, which through the compounding network effect generates
large profit increases in the more socially connected counties in 2000-2004. With an annual discount factor
of 0.8, the return on the subsidy, based on the additional (discounted) profits that were generated over the
1995-1999 and 2000-2004 periods minus the cost of the subsidy, would have been 12% for countries above the
mean population density and -45% for counties below the mean.
Figure 12b reports the impact of an alternative government program, which only gives the subsidy to
those origin counties who would have increased their aggregate discounted profits over the 1995-2004 period
by more than the amount of subsidy they received in the preceding counter-factual experiment. To keep the
total amount of the subsidy constant, the interest rate for the targeted counties is now reduced to 0.11. The
increase in profits minus the subsidy received is reported across the population density distribution in the
figure, both for the original subsidy scheme and for the targeted subsidy scheme. As can be seen, the targeted
program does strictly better if the government’s objective is to maximize total profit (less the subsidy cost).
Notice also that average initial capital, which is declining with population density, declines even more steeply
with the more efficient targeted program.
Two stylized facts motivate a large and growing macro-development literature on misallocation: (i) that
the variation in marginal productivity and, hence, firm size within narrow sectors is too wide in developing
economies, and (ii) that firms in those economies are too small (Peters, 2016). Although a number of
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mechanisms have been proposed to explain these facts; e.g. Caunedo (2016), Asker et al. (2014), Peters
(2016), and Akcigit et al. (2016), perhaps the simplest is based on a model with mark-ups in output prices
and wedges in factor prices (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009, 2014). There are no
price distortions in our model or in the structural estimation. Networks arise in our model because there is
a missing market for productivity-enhancing assistance. We are, nevertheless, able to generate the stylized
facts, and a distinguishing feature of our network-based mechanism is that efficiency-enhancing policies could
actually result in even smaller firms and even greater dispersion in firm size in equilibrium (as observed in
Figure 12b).57 More generally, we would not want to infer that one developing economy is less efficient than
another developing economy because it has smaller firms or greater dispersion in firm size. Indeed, these
characteristics may be symptomatic of a more dynamic economy in which underlying community networks
are responding more effectively to market frictions.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we identify and quantify the role played by community networks, organized around the birth
county, in the growth of private enterprise in China. The model that we develop generates predictions for the
dynamics of firm entry, sectoral and spatial concentration, and firm size across birth counties with different
levels of social connectedness (measured by population density) when networks are active. We validate each
of these predictions over a twenty year period with unique administrative data that covers the universe of
registered firms and provides information on entrepreneurs’ birth counties. The rich set of results that we
obtain, taken together, allow us to rule out alternative non-network explanations. Additional results provide
direct support for the network channel, indicating that spillovers occur within the birth county and, going
down even further, within clans within the county. Having validated the model, we estimate its structural
57In our analysis, the marginal value product of capital does not vary across firms by construction. If we had used credit
market imperfections to motivate network formation instead, then a efficiency-enhancing policy that exploited network spillovers
would have increased the dispersion in marginal productivity within sectors (due to variation in interest rates across networks)
as well.
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parameters and conduct counter-factual simulations.
The first simulation shuts down the community networks. Our estimates indicate that this would have
reduced the total number of entering firms by 40% (with a comparable decline in the total capital stock) over
the 1995-2004 period. This was a critical period in China’s economic development, and given the network
multiplier effect, the long-term consequences of shutting down the networks at this time would have been
even more significant. Individual firms do not internalize the positive externality they generate for other
members of the network, which implies that a credit subsidy to stimulate entry could be efficiency enhancing.
Our second counter-factual experiment considers the effect of a one-time credit subsidy for entrants in the
1995-1999 period. This subsidy would have increased profits for infra-marginal firms (who would have entered
regardless) but, more importantly, would have induced additional firms to enter. Our estimates indicate that
the direct effect of the subsidy on profits in the 1995-1999 period would have been dwarfed by the indirect
spillover effect in the subsequent, 2000-2004, period, particularly in higher population density birth counties.
If the government’s objective was to maximize total profits, then these results indicate that a preferred
policy would target entrepreneurs from higher population density birth counties to take advantage of the
network externalities. The impact of such a targeted subsidy scheme is examined in a third counter-factual
simulation. With the targeting, the entrepreneurs induced to enter as a result of the subsidy would be drawn
exclusively from higher population density counties. Networks are relatively strong in those counties and,
thus, these individuals would have relatively low ability among all marginal entrepreneurs. In general, the
optimal policy to stimulate entry and maximize profits would place weight on both individual ability and the
potential spillover effect from individual entry on the community of origin.
There are, however, two caveats to the preceding policy prescription. First, a policy that places weight on
both social affiliation and individual merit will only be effective in a population where community networks
are already active or have the potential to be activated, and this will depend on the underlying social
structure. In particular, the Chinese development experience will not be replicated in other countries by
simply providing infrastructure and credit. This is relevant for Chinese overseas development assistance
policy, which has largely focussed on infrastructure construction and industrial development (Zhang, 2016).58
Chinese development assistance has grown exponentially in recent years (Lin and Wang, 2016), but our
analysis indicates that the expected returns will only be realized if community networks in the recipient
countries evolve in parallel with the infrastructure construction, just as they did in China. The second caveat
is that even if the social structure is amenable to network-based growth, there are important consequences
for inequality that must be considered. By bringing in less able entrepreneurs at the margin, community
networks are redistributive within their populations. However, a policy that targets individuals from more
socially connected populations to take advantage of the positive externalities that their stronger networks
provide will only exacerbate existing inequalities across communities. Given the dynamic increasing returns
that are generated by the networks, these inequalities will persist and, if anything, worsen over time. Absent
other redistributive mechanisms, any policy that attempts to exploit network externalities must pay attention
to the potentially enduring consequences for inter-community inequality.
58This policy is explicitly motivated by the Chinese domestic experience, and the belief that infrastructure construction is the
key to development (see, for example, China’s second Africa policy paper; Xinhua, December 4, 2015).
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Appendix A. Extension: Entry with Foresight
Consider the consequences of allowing entrepreneurs to look ahead and incorporate profits they would expect
to make after the first period they enter. We suppose cohort t agents look ahead one additional period, i.e.,
make their entry decision based on anticipated present value profits in periods t and t+1. The equilibrium can
no longer be computed recursively, owing to the need for entrants to coordinate their expectations of entry
decisions of one another. We shall consider equilibria where these expectations are fulfilled. We continue to
assume that incumbents are committed to their previous entry decisions.
Let ξ denote ψr−
α
1−α , and δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the common discount factor of agents. Then expected present






1− α)[1 + δ exp(θ(p)eit
1
1− α)] (27)
while of staying in T is
Nit(ω) = ω
σ[1 + δ] (28)
The agent will enter if
logω >
1
1− σ [− log ξ −
1
1− α logA0 + log(1 + δ)−
1




g(e|si,t−1, ni,t−1, Ai0) = ksi,t−1{1 + 11−σ [log ξ + 11−α logA0 − log(1 + δ)
+ 11−αθ(p)ni,t−1 + log{1 + δ exp(θ(p)e 11−α)}]}
Then equilibrium entry decisions form a fixed point of this function, i.e., eit = e(si,t−1, ni,t−1, Ai0) solves
g(e|si,t−1, ni,t−1, Ai0) = e (30)
The intercept of this function is exactly the entry that results in the myopic equilbrium with δ = 0. The
function is increasing in e, with a slope
g′(e|si,t−1, ni,t−1, Ai0) = si,t−1
δ exp( θ(p)e1−α )
1 + δ exp( θ(p)e1−α )
kθ(p)
(1− α)(1− σ) (31)
Hence if
kθp¯
(1− α)(1− σ) < 1 (32)
where p¯ is an upper bound for p, an equilibrium exists and is unique. Computing the equilibrium is easy, as
it involves solving for fixed points of a contracting mapping defined recursively by past entry decisions. It
can be easily verified that entry is rising in si,t−1, θ(p) and ni,t−1, just as in the myopic entry case.
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Appendix B. Derivation of the Adjusted HHI
Suppose that there are n trials, that each outcome j from the set of k possible outcomes has an independent
probability of occurring pj , and that the random variable Xj is the number of occurrences of outcome j.
Then the multivariate random variable X = (X1, · · · , Xk) has a multinomial distribution with parameters
(n, k, p1, · · · , pk). Applied to our context, (i) n is the total number of firms that enter from a given birth
county in a given period, (ii) k is the total number of sectors or locations that they select into, and (iii)
p1, · · · , pk are the probabilities that a firm choosing independently would select each of those sectors or
destinations. We assume that there is an equal probability of choosing any sector or destination; pj =
1
M ,∀j.



















































For large n, E(HHI) ≈ 1k . For small n, E(HHI) is decreasing in n. We account for this by constructing a
normalized HHI statistic, which is simply the unadjusted HHI, based on the observed distribution of firms
across sectors or locations, divided by E(HHI). If firms make decisions independently, then the adjusted
HHI will be close to one, providing us with a useful benchmark for this statistic.
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Appendix C. Figures
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Appendix D. Tables
Table D.1. Local Social Interactions, Trust, and Population Density (with controls)
Dependent variable:
frequency of chatting
per month with local
residents
whether the respondent
chats most with a local
resident
trust in local residents
(1) (2) (3)
Population density 4.381* 0.066** 0.692***
(2.575) (0.033) (0.174)
Observations 8,572 20,070 19,389
Source: China Family Panel Survey (2010, 2012).
Trust is an ordinal variable, and takes value from 0 to 10.
Control variables include population, education, and occupation distribution in the county.
Education is measured by the percent of the population that is literate and occupation distribution is measured as the share of workers
in the county in agriculture and industry. Service is the excluded category.
County characteristics, including population density, are derived from the 1982 population census.
Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table D.2. Sectoral and Spatial Concentration and Population Density (with controls)
Dependent variable: adjusted HHI across sectors adjusted HHI across locations
Year: 1994 1999 2004 2009 1994 1999 2004 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth county population density 0.106*** 0.417*** 0.444*** 0.574*** 0.023** 0.052*** 0.068** 0.110**
(0.023) (0.057) (0.061) (0.074) (0.011) (0.017) (0.034) (0.054)
Observations 1,622 1,624 1,624 1,624 5,479 15,132 23,753 26,784
Note: sectoral concentration measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) across two-digit sectors, divided by the expected HHI
that would be obtained by random assignment, given the number of entrants and the number of sectors at each point in time.
Spatial concentration, within one-digit sectors, is measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) across destinations (outside the
birth county), divided by the expected HHI that would be obtained by random assignment, given the number of entrants and the number
of destinations at each point in time.
Control variables include population, education and occupation distribution in the birth county.
Sector fixed effects included in the regression with spatial HHI as the dependent variable.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table D.3. Marginal Ability, Marginal Initial Capital and Population Density (with controls)
Dependent variable: marginal ability marginal initial capital
Time period: 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth county population density -1.829 -2.685*** -3.570*** -1.435*** -0.100*** -0.118*** -0.134*** -0.041***
(1.369) (1.103) (0.807) (0.755) (0.030) (0.026) (0.017) (0.010)
Mean of dependent variable 66.07 52,47 40.79 40.15 -0.803 -1.093 -1.669 -2.225
Observations 4,079 6,595 10,354 11,137 15,601 46,877 83,276 99,877
Note: the entrepreneur’s ability is measured by his percentile rank in his birth county-birth cohort education distribution.
The marginal entrepreneur is defined as the individual at the bottom one percentile of the ability distribution among entering entrepreneurs
in a given birth county-sector-time period. Marginal initial capital defined as the bottom one percentile of the initial capital distribution
at the birth county-sector-time period level.
Control variables include population, education and occupation distribution in the birth county.
Standard errors clustered at birth county level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table D.4. The Effect of Initial Entry on Subsequent Entry (controlling for distance)
Dependent variable: subsequent entrants from the birth county
Time period: 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial entrants from the birth county 5.239*** 5.202*** 5.796*** 5.739***
(1.065) (1.063) (1.356) (1.351)
Initial entrants from the birth county
× birth county population density 1.361** 1.371** 2.262** 2.276**
(0.619) (0.618) (0.991) (0.990)
Distance from the birth county to the
destination – -0.002*** – -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean of dependent variable 3.065 3.065 3.128 3.128
Observations 413,452 413,452 804,918 804,918
Note: number of entrants is measured at the (two-digit) sector-destination level.
Initial entry is derived over the 1990-1994 period.
Distance, from the centroid of the birth county to the centroid of the destination, is measured in thousands of km.
All specifications include birth place-sector fixed effects.
Number of entrants is obtained from the SAIC registration database and birth county population density is derived from the 1982
population census.
Standard errors clustered at birthplace-sector level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table D.5. Synthetic Entry (based on initial destinations) and Population Density
Dependent variable: synthetic entry
Time period: 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth county population density -0.003* 0.007 0.010 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013)
Constant 0.137** 0.523*** 1.369*** 1.750***
(0.068) (0.161) (0.364) (0.490)
Observations 15,694 15,694 15,694 15,694
Note: synthetic entry (in thousands) in each time period is measured by the weighted average of total entry (from all origins excluding
the birth county) across all destinations for a given birth county-sector.
The weight on a given destination is the fraction of initial(1990-1994) entrants from the birth county-sector who located at that destination.
All specification include sector fixed effects. To be consistent with Table 5, population, education and occupation distribution in the birth
county are included as control variables in the estimating equation.
Standard errors clustered at birth county level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table D.6. Clan Concentration and Population Density
Dependent variable: adjusted HHI across clans
Year: 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth county population density 0.167*** 0.535*** 0.835*** 0.873***
(0.014) (0.027) (0.037) (0.045)
Constant 0.730*** 1.643*** 3.283*** 4.785***
(0.010) (0.022) (0.033) (0.042)
Observations 1,607 1,624 1,624 1,624
Note: clan is defined by the same surname group and the same birth county.
Clan concentration measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) across surnames of entering entrepreneurs from a given birth
county, divided by the expected HHI that would be obtained by random assignment, given the number of surnames (clans) and the
number of entrants from the birth county at each point in time.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table D.7a. Estimates based on Actual and Model Generated Data (In-Sample)



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth couunty
population density 0.335*** 0.215*** 0.109*** 0.171*** -0.010** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.034) (0.030) (0.016) (0.025) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time period 0.476*** 0.305*** 0.095*** 0.369*** -0.202*** -0.191*** -0.151*** -0.191***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032 18,401 18,401 18,401 18,401
Table D.7b. Estimates based on Actual and Model Generated Data (Out of Sample)



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth county
population density 0.920*** 0.988*** 0.426*** 1.683*** 0.268*** 0.662*** 0.569*** 0.508***
(0.083) (0.132) (0.086) (0.189) (0.018) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025)
Constant 1.331*** 1.228*** 0.320*** 2.060*** 2.809*** 2.847*** 3.149*** 3.706***
(0.041) (0.055) (0.032) (0.082) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516
Note: in-sample estimates based on two time periods, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004 and out of sample estimates based on the 2005-2009
period.
Firm entry (in thousands) measured at the birth county-time period level. Initial capital (in million Yuan) is measured in logs. Average
initial capital is the average of the initial capital distribution at the birth county-sector-time period level. Sectoral concentration, across
one-digit sectors, is adjusted for expected concentration due to random assignment.
Time period is a binary variable taking the value one for the 2000-2004 period and zero for the 1995-1999 period.
Actual firm entry, initial capital and HHI are obtained from the SAIC registration database and birth county population density is derived
from the 1982 population census.
Standard errors clustered at the birth county level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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